IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cai/reldbu/rel_702_0193.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

L'émergence d'une banque supérieure sous le régime de la liberté bancaire

Author

Listed:
  • Laurent Le Maux

Abstract

La théorie de la banque centrale analyse la hiérarchisation bancaire dans le cadre du monopole d'émission de billets de banque. Or sous le régime de la liberté bancaire dans lequel les banques peuvent émettre des billets et des dépôts à vue sans restrictions quantitatives ou autres, la structure bancaire converge également vers la hiérarchisation. L'émergence d'une banque supérieure intervenant en tant que prêteur en dernier ressort est alors un phénomène spontané et constitue une innovation du système de paiement afin d'endiguer les ruées de remboursement, et non une création du législateur ou une conséquence de la réglementation. Afin d'établir un système bancaire rigoureusement décentralisé, c'est-à-dire sans banque supérieure, les chambres de compensation doivent respecter des règles très strictes leur interdisant de créer de la monnaie supérieure. Sans ces règles et sans cette intervention du législateur, la structure hiérarchisée du système bancaire est alors définitive.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Laurent Le Maux, 2004. "L'émergence d'une banque supérieure sous le régime de la liberté bancaire," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 70(2), pages 193-221.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_702_0193
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REL_702_0193
    Download Restriction: free
    File URL: http://www.cairn.info/revue-recherches-economiques-de-louvain-2004-2-page-193.htm
    Download Restriction: free
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomas M. Humphrey & Robert E. Keleher, 1984. "The lender of last resort : a historical perspective," Working Paper 84-03, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    2. Arthur J. Rolnick & Warren E. Weber, 1998. "The Suffolk Banking System reconsidered," Working Papers 587, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    3. Charles Goodhart, 1988. "The Evolution of Central Banks," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262570734, December.
    4. George A. Selgin & Lawrence H. White, 1994. "How Would the Invisible Hand Handle Money?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 32(4), pages 1718-1749, December.
    5. Lake, Wilfred S., 1947. "The End of the Suffolk System," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 183-207, November.
    6. Lawrence H. White, 1983. "Competitive Money, Inside and Out," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 3(1), pages 281-304, Spring.
    7. Thomas H. Humphrey & Robert E. Keleher, 1984. "The Lender of Last Resort; A Historical Perspective," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 4(1), pages 275-321, Spring/Su.
    8. Arthur J. Rolnick & Bruce Smith & Warren E. Weber, 2000. "The Suffolk Bank and the Panic of 1837," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Spr), pages 3-13.
    9. Timberlake, Richard H, Jr, 1984. "The Central Banking Role of Clearinghouse Associations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(1), pages 1-15, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Laurent Le Maux, 2021. "Bagehot for Central Bankers," Working Papers Series inetwp147, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
    2. Vincent Bignon & Marc Flandreau & Stefano Ugolini, 2012. "Bagehot for beginners: the making of lender‐of‐last‐resort operations in the mid‐nineteenth century," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 65(2), pages 580-608, May.
    3. Antoine Martin, 2005. "Reconciling Bagehot with the Fed's response to September 11," Staff Reports 217, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    4. Claudio Borio, 2019. "On money, debt, trust and central banking," BIS Working Papers 763, Bank for International Settlements.
    5. Antoine Martin, 2009. "Reconciling Bagehot and the Fed's Response to September 11," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(2‐3), pages 397-415, March.
    6. Laurent Le Maux, 2018. "Central banking and finance: the Bank of England and the Bank Act of 1844," Post-Print hal-02854521, HAL.
    7. Marvin Goodfriend & Robert G. King, 1988. "Financial deregulation, monetary policy, and central banking," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 74(May), pages 3-22.
    8. Pablo Paniagua, 2017. "The institutional rationale of central banking reconsidered," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 231-256, September.
    9. Fernando Ossa, 2003. "Los Bancos Centrales como Prestamistas de Última Instancia," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 40(120), pages 323-335.
    10. Marvin Goodfriend & Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1999. "Limited commitment and central bank lending," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Fall, pages 1-27.
    11. repec:wvu:wpaper:10-20 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Vincent Bignon & Marc Flandreau & Stefano Ugolini, 2009. "Bagehot for beginners: The making of lending of last resort operations in the mid-19th century," Working Paper 2009/22, Norges Bank.
    13. Young, Andrew T. & Dove, John A., 2013. "Policing the chain gang: Panel cointegration analysis of the stability of the Suffolk System, 1825–1858," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 182-196.
    14. E Philip Davis, 2008. "Liquidity, Financial Crises and the Lender of Last Resort – How Much of a Departure is the Sub-prime Crisis?," RBA Annual Conference Volume (Discontinued), in: Paul Bloxham & Christopher Kent (ed.),Lessons from the Financial Turmoil of 2007 and 2008, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    15. Salter, Alexander William & Young, Andrew T., 2018. "A theory of self-enforcing monetary constitutions with reference to the Suffolk System, 1825–1858," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 13-22.
    16. Nicholas A. Curott & Tyler Watts & Benjamin R. Thrasher, 2020. "Government-Cheerleading Bias in Money and Banking Textbooks," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 17(1), pages 1-98–151, March.
    17. Laurent Le Maux & Laurence Scialom, 2013. "Central banks and financial stability: rediscovering the lender-of-last-resort practice in a finance economy," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 37(1), pages 1-16.
    18. Gerald P. O'Driscoll, 1984. "Safety-net mechanisms: the case of international lending," Working Papers 8404, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    19. Hiroshi Fujiki & Edward J. Green & Akira Yamazaki, 1999. "Sharing the risk of settlement failure," Working Papers 594, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    20. Fabio Castiglionesi & Wolf Wagner, 2012. "Turning Bagehot on His Head: Lending at Penalty Rates When Banks Can Become Insolvent," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(1), pages 201-219, February.
    21. Bryan Caplan & Edward Stringham, 2003. "Networks, Law, and the Paradox of Cooperation," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 16(4), pages 309-326, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • N11 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_702_0193. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cairn.info/revue-recherches-economiques-de-louvain.htm .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.