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L'émergence d'une banque supérieure sous le régime de la liberté bancaire

Listed author(s):
  • Laurent Le Maux

La théorie de la banque centrale analyse la hiérarchisation bancaire dans le cadre du monopole d'émission de billets de banque. Or sous le régime de la liberté bancaire dans lequel les banques peuvent émettre des billets et des dépôts à vue sans restrictions quantitatives ou autres, la structure bancaire converge également vers la hiérarchisation. L'émergence d'une banque supérieure intervenant en tant que prêteur en dernier ressort est alors un phénomène spontané et constitue une innovation du système de paiement afin d'endiguer les ruées de remboursement, et non une création du législateur ou une conséquence de la réglementation. Afin d'établir un système bancaire rigoureusement décentralisé, c'est-à-dire sans banque supérieure, les chambres de compensation doivent respecter des règles très strictes leur interdisant de créer de la monnaie supérieure. Sans ces règles et sans cette intervention du législateur, la structure hiérarchisée du système bancaire est alors définitive.

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Article provided by De Boeck Université in its journal Recherches économiques de Louvain.

Volume (Year): 70 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 193-221

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Handle: RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_702_0193
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-recherches-economiques-de-louvain.htm

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  1. Thomas M. Humphrey & Robert E. Keleher, 1984. "The lender of last resort : a historical perspective," Working Paper 84-03, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  2. Arthur J. Rolnick & Warren E. Weber, 1998. "The Suffolk Banking System reconsidered," Working Papers 587, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  3. George A. Selgin & Lawrence H. White, 1994. "How Would the Invisible Hand Handle Money?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 32(4), pages 1718-1749, December.
  4. Lake, Wilfred S., 1947. "The End of the Suffolk System," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(02), pages 183-207, November.
  5. Lawrence H. White, 1983. "Competitive Money, Inside and Out," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 3(1), pages 281-304, Spring.
  6. Arthur J. Rolnick & Bruce D. Smith & Warren E. Weber, 2000. "The Suffolk Bank and the Panic of 1837," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Spr, pages 3-13.
  7. Timberlake, Richard H, Jr, 1984. "The Central Banking Role of Clearinghouse Associations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(1), pages 1-15, February.
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