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Political Beliefs and Tort Awards: Evidence of Rationally Political Jurors from Two Data Sets

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  • Wentland Scott

    (Longwood University)

Abstract

To better understand jury decision-making, this paper explores the extent to which jurors’ political beliefs impact real world trial outcomes. The key finding of this study is a strong empirical link between a jury pool’s political leanings and tort awards, robust across two distinct data sets, namely pooled panels from the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts and Jury Verdict Research data. I find that a one standard deviation (12%) increase in a jury pool’s Democratic vote (in presidential elections) increases tort awards by approximately $157,600 (or 30%) on average. This general relationship remains consistent through county and time fixed effects estimations, and controlling for a number of socioeconomic demographics. While the empirics presented here do not establish a definitive causal link, the data lends evidence to the case for what I call a “rationally political juror,” suggesting further examination into juror incentives and decision-making.

Suggested Citation

  • Wentland Scott, 2012. "Political Beliefs and Tort Awards: Evidence of Rationally Political Jurors from Two Data Sets," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(3), pages 619-656, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:8:y:2012:i:3:p:619-656:n:3
    DOI: 10.1515/1555-5879.1514
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    References listed on IDEAS

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