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Clientelism, Law and Politics. Considerations in the Light of the Argentine Case

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  • Rivas Pedro

    (Universidad Austral, Buenos Aires, Argentina)

Abstract

The purpose of this article is, on the one hand, to explain what clientelism is through a description of its characteristics in its current Argentinean form. On the other hand, it will evaluate clientelism from a legal and political point of view. In order to achieve these purposes, we will distinguish clientelism from legitimate politics, and then offer a critical evaluation in case there were any differences. Regarding the first objective, it will be necessary to resort to some kind of canonical definition, broad enough to grasp different clientelistic phenomena. Then, it will be possible to explain its Argentinean particularities, noting that it happens to be a specially interesting kind of clientelism because of its refinement and breadth. As to the second objective, we will oppose to the reasoning that equates clientelism and legitimate types of political action. We will argue that ordinary politics is different and that, in fact, this difference turns clientelism illegitimate. Criticism against clientelism may include empirical approaches but, as these only show deficiencies of a particular public policy, they lack the ability to be extended to other cases. Alternative criticism may be more interesting, but it will necessarily be weaker as it may only reveal a model of citizens and political relations upon which clientelism is grounded.

Suggested Citation

  • Rivas Pedro, 2017. "Clientelism, Law and Politics. Considerations in the Light of the Argentine Case," The Law and Development Review, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 497-519, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:lawdev:v:10:y:2017:i:2:p:497-519:n:10
    DOI: 10.1515/ldr-2017-0023
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stokes, Susan C., 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(3), pages 315-325, August.
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