Economic Efficiency and Damage Awards in Personal Injury Torts
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DOI: 10.2202/1932-9156.1007
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- George A. Schieren, 2007. "Economic Efficiency and Damage Awards in Personal Injury Torts," Working Papers 07-08, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
References listed on IDEAS
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- George A. Schieren, 1998. "The Economic Framework Of Personal Injury/Wrongful Death Damages," Journal of Forensic Economics, National Association of Forensic Economics, vol. 11(1), pages 33-46, December.
- Calfee, John E & Rubin, Paul H, 1992. "Some Implications of Damage Payments for Nonpecuniary Losses," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 371-411, June.
- Arlen, Jennifer H, 1992. "Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 413-429, June.
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