Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2011.
"When is the optimal lending contract in microfinance state non-contingent?,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 55(5), pages 720-731, June.
- Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2010. "When Is the Optimal Lending Contract in Microfinance State Non-Contingent?," TSE Working Papers 10-146, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2010. "When Is the Optimal Lending Contract in Microfinance State Non-Contingent?," IDEI Working Papers 599, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Jonathan Conning, 2005. "Monitoring by Peers or by Delegates? Joint Liability Loans and Moral Hazard," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 407, Hunter College Department of Economics.
- Ishida, Junichiro, 2009. "Incentives in academics: Collaboration under weak complementarities," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 215-223, April.
- Landeo, Claudia M. & Spier, Kathryn E., 2015.
"Incentive contracts for teams: Experimental evidence,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 496-511.
- Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2015. "Incentive Contracts for Teams: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 2015-53, Peruvian Economic Association.
- Landeo, Claudia & Spier, Kathryn, 2015. "Incentive Contracts for Teams: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 2015-9, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
- Ahlin, Christian, 2015. "The role of group size in group lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 140-155.
- Ahlin, Christian & Waters, Brian, 2016. "Dynamic microlending under adverse selection: Can it rival group lending?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 237-257.
- Hisaki KONO & Kazushi TAKAHASHI, 2010. "Microfinance Revolution: Its Effects, Innovations, And Challenges," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 48(1), pages 15-73.
- Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata & Maitra, Pushkar, 2012.
"Moral hazard and peer monitoring in a laboratory microfinance experiment,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 192-209.
- Timothy N. Cason & Lata Gangadharan & Pushkar Maitra, 2008. "Moral Hazard and Peer Monitoring in a Laboratory Microfinance Experiment," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1208, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Wided Mattoussi & Paul Seabright, 2014.
"Cooperation against Theft: A Test of Incentives for Water Management in Tunisia,"
American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 96(1), pages 124-153.
- Wided Mattoussi & Paul Seabright, 2009. "Cooperation Against Theft - A Test of Incentives for Water Management in Tunisia," Working Papers 491, Economic Research Forum, revised Jun 2009.
- Simtowe, Franklin & Zeller, Manfred, 2006. "Determinants of Moral Hazard in Microfinance: Empirical Evidence from Joint Liability Lending Programs in Malawi," MPRA Paper 461, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Simtowe, Franklin & Zeller, Manfred & Phiri, Alexander, 2006. "Determinants of Moral hazard in Microfinance: Empirical Evidence from Joint Liability Lending Schemes in Malawi," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25287, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Arghya Kusum Mukherjee & Amit Kundu, 2014. "Government-sponsored microfinance program: Joint liability vs. individual liability," Cogent Economics & Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(1), pages 1-14, December.
- Marx, Leslie M. & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Individual accountability in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 260-273, October.
- Paal, Beatrix & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Group insurance and lending with endogenous social collateral," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 30-40, January.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.2:y:2002:i:1:n:3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.