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Cooperation against Theft: A Test of Incentives for Water Management in Tunisia

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  • Wided Mattoussi
  • Paul Seabright

Abstract

Water theft carried out by manipulating water meters constrains volumetric pricing in semi-arid regions. Cooperative management can reduce theft and improve incentives for efficient water use by inducing peer monitoring. Using a theoretical model, we show that theft is more likely when prices are high, punishments are weak, and cooperatives are large. We also show how cooperative membership and punishment levels are determined endogenously by constraints on monitoring. We test the model on data from Tunisia for the years 2001-2003, relying on instruments that proxy for unobservable monitoring costs. The results confirm that well-designed incentives can reduce theft, and that constraints on monitoring costs affect institutional design.

Suggested Citation

  • Wided Mattoussi & Paul Seabright, 2014. "Cooperation against Theft: A Test of Incentives for Water Management in Tunisia," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 96(1), pages 124-153.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:96:y:2014:i:1:p:124-153.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ajae/aat083
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    Cited by:

    1. Jie Zhu & Xiangyang Zhou & Jin Guo, 2023. "Sustainability of Agriculture: A Study of Digital Groundwater Supervision," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(6), pages 1-15, March.
    2. Takayama, Taisuke & Matsuda, Hirotaka & Nakatani, Tomoaki, 2018. "The determinants of collective action in irrigation management systems: Evidence from rural communities in Japan," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 206(C), pages 113-123.
    3. Joseph,George & Ayling,Sophie Charlotte Emi & Miquel-Florensa,Pepita & Bejarano,Hernán D. & Cardona,Alejandra Quevedo, 2021. "Behavioral Insights in Infrastructure Sectors : A Survey," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9704, The World Bank.
    4. Cui, Yi & Du, Xiaodong & Ma, Jiujie, 2020. "Agricultural Water right reforms and Irrigation Water Demand: A Quasi-Natural Experiment in China," 2020 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, Kansas City, Missouri 304364, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    5. Mohamed Salah Matoussi & Wided Mattoussi, 2010. "On the Design of Total Water Use-Based Incentive Schemes for Sustainable Groundwater Management," Working Papers 575, Economic Research Forum, revised 12 Jan 2010.
    6. Mattoussi, Wided & Mattoussi, Foued & Larnaout, Afrah, 2023. "Optimal subsidization for the adoption of new irrigation technologies," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 1126-1141.
    7. Liangzhen Zang & Yahua Wang & Yiqing Su, 2021. "Does Farmland Scale Management Promote Rural Collective Action? An Empirical Study of Canal Irrigation Systems in China," Land, MDPI, vol. 10(11), pages 1-25, November.
    8. Paul Christian & Florence Kondylis & Valerie Mueller & Astrid Zwager & Tobias Siegfried, 2022. "Monitoring Water for Conservation: A Proof of Concept from Mozambique," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 104(1), pages 92-110, January.

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