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PRC Outward Investment in the USA and Europe: A Model of R&D Acquisition

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  • Joseph Pelzman

Abstract

In this paper, I present a theoretical framework designed to explain People's Republic of China (PRC) outward foeign direct investment in the USA and Europe, in search of research and development (R&D) acquisition modeled as positive “spillover effects” in a two-country model with firms distinguished by their ability to innovate. The motivation for this paper is the growing PRC merger and acquisition activity in Europe and the USA. The fact that the PRC, despite its many successful internal reforms, cannot induce innovation activity designed to alter its external sector from one that is based on cheap labor to one that is based on innovation-rich products, has forced it to use its extensive reserve holdings to acquire the necessary R&D via merger and acquisition. These acquisitions will allow the PRC to alter their domestic and export product mix and thus avoid the middle-income trap.

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  • Joseph Pelzman, 2015. "PRC Outward Investment in the USA and Europe: A Model of R&D Acquisition," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 1-14, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:19:y:2015:i:1:p:1-14
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/rode.12129
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Baomin Dong & Huasheng Song & Xiaolin Qian, 2016. "International R&D Collaboration and Strategic Trade Policy," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 250-260, February.
    2. Muhammad Saad Baloch & Abubakr Saeed & Ishtiaq Ahmed & Judit Oláh & József Popp & Domicián Máté, 2018. "Role of Domestic Financial Reforms and Internationalization of Non-Financial Transnational Firms: Evidence from the Chinese Market," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(11), pages 1-16, October.
    3. Borsi, Mihály Tamás & Valerio Mendoza, Octasiano Miguel & Comim, Flavio, 2022. "Measuring the provincial supply of higher education institutions in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).

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