Firm Compliance With Social Insurance Obligations Where There Is A Weak Surveillance And Enforcement Mechanism: Empirical Evidence From Shanghai
This article examines why firms in Shanghai comply or over-comply with social insurance obligations in a regulatory environment where the expected punishment for non-compliance is low. Our first finding is that firms found to be in non-compliance in the first audit in 2001 were moved into a separate violation category and the probability of being reaudited in 2002 was significantly higher if the firm was in that category. Our second main result is that, across the board, firms which were reaudited continued to underpay in 2002 but the extent of underpayment was significantly reduced. Copyright 2007 The Authors Journal compilation 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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Volume (Year): 12 (2007)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
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