Deception in Networks: A Laboratory Study
Author
Abstract
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Rong Rong & Daniel Houser, 2014. "Deception in Networks: A Laboratory Study," Working Papers 1046, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
References listed on IDEAS
- Sheremeta, Roman M. & Shields, Timothy W., 2013.
"Do liars believe? Beliefs and other-regarding preferences in sender–receiver games,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 268-277.
- Roman M. Sheremeta & Timothy Shields, 2012. "Do Liars Believe? Beliefs and Other-Regarding Preferences in Sender-Receiver Games," Working Papers 12-05, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Sheremeta, Roman & Shields, Timothy, 2013. "Do Liars Believe? Beliefs and Other-Regarding Preferences in Sender-Receiver Games," MPRA Paper 53595, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Matthias Sutter, 2009.
"Deception Through Telling the Truth?! Experimental Evidence From Individuals and Teams,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(534), pages 47-60, January.
- Matthias Sutter, 2009. "Deception Through Telling the Truth?! Experimental Evidence From Individuals and Teams," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(534), pages 47-60, January.
- Matthias Sutter, 2007. "Deception through telling the truth?! Experimental evidence from individuals and teams," Working Papers 2007-26, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Rong, Rong & Houser, Daniel & Dai, Anovia Yifan, 2016. "Money or friends: Social identity and deception in networks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 56-66.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Ismayilov, Huseyn & Potters, Jan, 2013. "Disclosing advisor's interests neither hurts nor helps," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 314-320.
- Despoina Alempaki & Valeria Burdea & Daniel Read, 2023. "Deceptive Communication: Direct Lies vs. Ignorance, Partial-Truth and Silence," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 444, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Valerio Capraro, 2018. "Gender differences in lying in sender-receiver games: A meta-analysis," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 13(4), pages 345-355, July.
- Bernd Irlenbusch & Janna Ter Meer, 2015. "Lying in public good games with and without punishment," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 06-02, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences.
- Bernd Irlenbusch & Janna Ter Meer, 2012. "Fooling the Nice Guys: The effect of lying about contributions on public good provision and punishment," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 03-11, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences.
- Jean Paul Rabanal & Olga A Rud, 2018.
"Does Competition Affect Truth Telling? An Experiment with Rating Agencies,"
Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 22(4), pages 1581-1604.
- Jean Paul Rabanal & Olga A. Rabanal, 2015. "Does competition affect truth-telling? An experiment with rating agencies," Working Papers 48, Peruvian Economic Association.
- Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Neururer, Daniel & Gruber, Alexander, 2019.
"Do altruists lie less?,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 560-579.
- Rudolf Kerschbamer & Daniel Neururer & Alexander Gruber, 2017. "Do the altruists lie less?," Working Papers 2017-18, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck, revised 09 Nov 2017.
- Irlenbusch, Bernd & Ter Meer, Janna, 2013. "Fooling the Nice Guys: Explaining receiver credulity in a public good game with lying and punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 321-327.
- Hanshu Zhang & Frederic Moisan & Palvi Aggarwal & Cleotilde Gonzalez, 2022. "Truth-Telling in a Sender-Receiver Game : Social Value Orientation and Incentives," Post-Print hal-04325602, HAL.
- repec:cup:judgdm:v:13:y:2018:i:4:p:345-355 is not listed on IDEAS
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & J Rosaz & J F Shogren, 2021.
"Can we commit future managers to honesty?,"
PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint)
halshs-03277342, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & J Rosaz & J F Shogren, 2021. "Can we commit future managers to honesty?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-03277342, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & J Rosaz & J F Shogren, 2021. "Can we commit future managers to honesty?," Post-Print halshs-03277342, HAL.
- Houser, Daniel & Vetter, Stefan & Winter, Joachim, 2012.
"Fairness and cheating,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1645-1655.
- Houser, Daniel & Vetter, Stefan & Winter, Joachim, 2010. "Fairness and Cheating," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 335, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Houser, Daniel & Vetter, Stefan & Winter, Joachim, 2012. "Fairness and cheating," Munich Reprints in Economics 19375, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Daniel Houser & Stefan Vetter & Joachim Winter, 2011. "Fairness and Cheating," Working Papers 1019, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
- Chlaß, Nadine & Riener, Gerhard, 2015.
"Lying, spying, sabotaging : procedures and consequences,"
Working Papers
15-17, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
- Chlaß, Nadine & Riener, Gerhard, 2015. "Lying, spying, sabotaging: Procedures and consequences," DICE Discussion Papers 196, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Nadine Chlaß & Gerhard Riener, 2015. "Lying, Spying, Sabotaging: Procedures and Consequences," Jena Economics Research Papers 2015-016, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Roman M. Sheremeta, 2016.
"The pros and cons of workplace tournaments,"
IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 302-302, October.
- Sheremeta, Roman, 2016. "The Pros and Cons of Workplace Tournaments," MPRA Paper 74859, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Roman M. Sheremeta, 2016. "The Pros and Cons of Workplace Tournaments," Working Papers 16-27, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Roman M. Sheremeta & Timothy W. Shields, 2017. "The Pros and Cons of Workplace Tournaments," Working Papers 17-04, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Vera Popva, 2010.
"What renders financial advisors less treacherous? - On commissions and reciprocity -,"
Jena Economics Research Papers
2010-036, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Vera Angelova, 2016. "What renders financial advisors less treacherous? On commissions and reciprocity," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2016-029, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
- Battiston, Pietro & Gamba, Simona & Rizzolli, Matteo & Rotondi, Valentina, 2021.
"Lies have long legs cheating, peer scrutiny and loyalty in teams,"
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
- Pietro Battiston & Simona Gamba & Matteo Rizzolli & Valentina Rotondi, 2018. "Lies have long legs. Cheating, public scrutiny and loyalty in teams," Econometica Working Papers wp67, Econometica.
- Vranceanu, Radu & Dubart, Delphine, 2019. "Deceitful communication in a sender-receiver experiment: Does everyone have a price?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 43-52.
- Danilov, Anastasia & Biemann, Torsten & Kring, Thorn & Sliwka, Dirk, 2013.
"The dark side of team incentives: Experimental evidence on advice quality from financial service professionals,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 266-272.
- Anastasia Danilov & Torsten Biemann & Thorn Kring & Dirk Sliwka, 2012. "The dark side of team incentives: Experimental evidence on advice quality from financial service professionals," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 03-13, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences, revised 18 Dec 2012.
- Rosaz, Julie & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2012.
"Lies and biased evaluation: A real-effort experiment,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 537-549.
- Julie Rosaz & Marie Claire Villeval, 2010. "Lies and Biased Evaluation in a Real-Effort Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00576664, HAL.
- Julie Rosaz & Marie Claire Villeval, 2011. "Lies and Biased Evaluation in a Real-Effort Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00618272, HAL.
- Julie Rosaz & Marie Claire Villeval, 2010. "Lies and Biased Evaluation in a Real-Effort Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00576667, HAL.
- Julie Rosaz & Marie Claire Villeval, 2010. "Lies and Biased Evaluation in a Real-Effort Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00576665, HAL.
- Julie Rosaz & Marie Claire Villeval, 2012. "Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00617120, HAL.
- Julie Rosaz & Marie Claire Villeval, 2011. "Lies and Biased Evaluation in a Real-Effort Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00618271, HAL.
- Rosaz, Julie & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2011. "Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 5884, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Julie Rosaz & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2011. "Lies and Biased Evaluation : A Real-Effort Experiment," Working Papers 1124, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Julie Rosaz & Marie Claire Villeval, 2011. "Lies and Biased Evaluation in a Real-Effort Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00625457, HAL.
- Julie Rosaz & Marie Claire Villeval, 2011. "Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00947962, HAL.
- Ayelet Gneezy & Alex Imas & Amber Brown & Leif D. Nelson & Michael I. Norton, 2012. "Paying to Be Nice: Consistency and Costly Prosocial Behavior," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(1), pages 179-187, January.
- Fochmann, Martin & Wolf, Nadja, 2019. "Framing and salience effects in tax evasion decisions – An experiment on underreporting and overdeducting," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 260-277.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:18:y:2016:i:2:p:313-326. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/apettea.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.