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Attempting to Detect a Lie: Do We Think it Through?

Author

Listed:
  • Iuliia Grabova

    (HU Berlin, DIW Berlin)

  • Hedda Nielsen

    (HU Berlin)

  • Georg Weizsäcker

    (HU Berlin)

Abstract

Game-theoretic analyses of communication rely on beliefs – especially, the receiver’s belief about the truth status of an utterance and the sender’s belief about the reaction to the utterance – but research that provides measurements of such beliefs is still in its infancy. Our experiment examines the use of second-order beliefs, measuring belief hierarchies regarding a message that may be a lie. In a two-player communication game between a sender and a receiver, the sender knows the state of the world and has a transparent incentive to deceive the receiver. The receiver chooses a binary reaction. For a wide set of non-equilibrium beliefs, the reaction and the receiver’s second-order belief should dissonate: she should follow the sender’s statement if and only if she believes that the sender believes that she does not follow the statement. The opposite is true empirically, constituting a new pattern of inconsistency between actions and beliefs.

Suggested Citation

  • Iuliia Grabova & Hedda Nielsen & Georg Weizsäcker, 2023. "Attempting to Detect a Lie: Do We Think it Through?," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 477, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    • Handle: RePEc:rco:dpaper:477
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Manski, Charles F. & Neri, Claudia, 2013. "First- and second-order subjective expectations in strategic decision-making: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 232-254.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    strategic information transmission; lying; higher-order beliefs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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