Vertical Integration, Variable Proportions and Successive Oligopolies
This paper investigates the problem of how the effect of vertical integration upon the final product price is related to the production and/or market structures. Some ambiguous results of the previous models are shown to involve the compound effect of vertical an d horizontal merger. This model considers purely vertical integration and shows that the (Lerner) index of monopoly remains unaffected before and after merger. Vertical integration is shown accordingly to yield an unambiguous decrease in the final product price-an increase in consumer welfare. Implications for antitrust laws are also discussed. Copyright 1988 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 36 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0022-1821|