IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jfnres/v28y2005i4p575-589.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Evidence On The Market For Professional Directors

Author

Listed:
  • Phyllis Y. Keys
  • Joanne Li

Abstract

Using the temporary increase in the supply of directors associated with successful tender offers, we examine characteristics of directors who are valuable in the market for board seats. We find that after a takeover, professional directors are three times more likely to receive new appointments than other types of directors released from their respective boards. We find that the proportion of professional directors in above-average performing targets is significantly greater than that in underperforming targets. Our results indicate that professional directors generally have valuable general human capital that more than offsets the costs of multiple directorships. 2005 The Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Phyllis Y. Keys & Joanne Li, 2005. "Evidence On The Market For Professional Directors," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 28(4), pages 575-589.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfnres:v:28:y:2005:i:4:p:575-589
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1475-6803.2005.00140.x
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Macey, Jonathan R. & O'Hara, Maureen, 2016. "Bank corporate governance: a proposal for the post-crisis world," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Aug, pages 85-105.
    2. Benson, Bradley W. & Davidson, Wallace N. & Davidson, Travis R. & Wang, Hongxia, 2015. "Do busy directors and CEOs shirk their responsibilities? Evidence from mergers and acquisitions," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 1-19.
    3. Hunton, James E. & Rose, Jacob M., 2008. "Can directors' self-interests influence accounting choices?," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 33(7-8), pages 783-800.
    4. Jingoo Kang, 2016. "Labor market evaluation versus legacy conservation: What factors determine retiring CEOs' decisions about long-term investment?," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 389-405, February.
    5. Lee, Changmin, 2011. "New evidence on what happens to CEOs after they retire," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 474-482, June.
    6. repec:eee:jebusi:v:92:y:2017:i:c:p:63-79 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. repec:eee:riibaf:v:41:y:2017:i:c:p:590-599 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jfnres:v:28:y:2005:i:4:p:575-589. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/sfaaaea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.