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Evidence On The Market For Professional Directors

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  • Phyllis Y. Keys
  • Joanne Li

Abstract

Using the temporary increase in the supply of directors associated with successful tender offers, we examine characteristics of directors who are valuable in the market for board seats. We find that after a takeover, professional directors are three times more likely to receive new appointments than other types of directors released from their respective boards. We find that the proportion of professional directors in above‐average performing targets is significantly greater than that in underperforming targets. Our results indicate that professional directors generally have valuable general human capital that more than offsets the costs of multiple directorships.

Suggested Citation

  • Phyllis Y. Keys & Joanne Li, 2005. "Evidence On The Market For Professional Directors," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 28(4), pages 575-589, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfnres:v:28:y:2005:i:4:p:575-589
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6803.2005.00140.x
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    Cited by:

    1. M. Farwis & M. C. A. Nazar & A. A. Azeez, 2020. "Corporate Board and Firm Risk: An Emerging Market Perspective," International Journal of Financial Research, International Journal of Financial Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 11(6), pages 301-317, December.
    2. Hunton, James E. & Rose, Jacob M., 2008. "Can directors' self-interests influence accounting choices?," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 33(7-8), pages 783-800.
    3. Ferris, Stephen P. & Javakhadze, David & Liu, Yun, 2020. "The price of boardroom social capital: The effects of corporate demand for external connectivity," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    4. James, Hui Liang & Wang, Hongxia & Xie, Yamin, 2018. "Busy directors and firm performance: Does firm location matter?," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 1-37.
    5. Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, 2016. "Bank corporate governance: a proposal for the post-crisis world," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Aug, pages 85-105.
    6. Jannine Poletti‐Hughes & Beatriz Martínez Garcia, 2022. "Leverage in family firms: The moderating role of female directors and board quality," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(1), pages 207-223, January.
    7. Jingoo Kang, 2016. "Labor market evaluation versus legacy conservation: What factors determine retiring CEOs' decisions about long-term investment?," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 389-405, February.
    8. James, Hui Liang & Ngo, Thanh & Wang, Hongxia, 2021. "Independent director tenure and corporate transparency," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    9. Lee, Changmin, 2011. "New evidence on what happens to CEOs after they retire," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 474-482, June.
    10. Baran, Lindsay, 2017. "Director connectedness and firm value in S&P 500 Index reconstitutions," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 63-79.
    11. Benson, Bradley W. & Davidson, Wallace N. & Davidson, Travis R. & Wang, Hongxia, 2015. "Do busy directors and CEOs shirk their responsibilities? Evidence from mergers and acquisitions," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 1-19.
    12. Le, Quyen & Vafaei, Alireza & Ahmed, Kamran & Kutubi, Shawgat, 2022. "Independent directors' reputation incentives and firm performance – an Australian perspective," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    13. Benson, Bradley W. & Chen, Yu & James, Hui L. & Park, Jung Chul, 2020. "So far away from me: Firm location and the managerial ownership effect on firm value," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    14. Reguera-Alvarado, Nuria & Bravo, Francisco, 2017. "The effect of independent directors’ characteristics on firm performance: Tenure and multiple directorships," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 590-599.
    15. Bradley Benson & Travis Davidson & Hui James & Hongxia Wang, 2022. "Board busyness and corporate payout: are all busy directors the same?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(3), pages 3711-3759, September.
    16. Andersen, Angela & Garel, Alexandre & Gilbert, Aaron & Tourani-Rad, Alireza, 2022. "Social capital, human capital, and board appointments," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).

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