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The Effects of Crises and European Fiscal Governance Reforms on the Budgetary Processes of Member States

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  • Ringa Raudla
  • Sebastian Bur
  • Kati Keel

Abstract

The goal of this article was to explore how the experience of the crisis and the fiscal governance reforms at the European level have influenced budget processes in member states. Drawing on the Europeanization, fiscal governance and pubic crisis management literature, the article first outlines a series of propositions about the kinds of shifts in the budget process that we would expect to ensue from the crisis experience and European reforms. The empirical part of our article explores the validity of those theoretical conjectures in three different member states: Portugal, Austria and Finland. We found that the crisis experience and European reforms have led to increased centralization of the budgetary process in all three countries. Although we would have expected Austria and Portugal to move closer towards the contracts approach of fiscal governance, this has not happened as the medium‐term expenditure frameworks are not viewed as binding.

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  • Ringa Raudla & Sebastian Bur & Kati Keel, 2020. "The Effects of Crises and European Fiscal Governance Reforms on the Budgetary Processes of Member States," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(3), pages 740-756, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:58:y:2020:i:3:p:740-756
    DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12972
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ringa Raudla & James W. Douglas & Muiris MacCarthaigh, 2022. "Medium‐term expenditure frameworks: Credible instrument or mirage?," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 71-92, September.
    2. Dimitrios Argyroulis, 2023. "The European Semester: An Ordoliberal Construct?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 143-160, January.
    3. Ringa Raudla & James W. Douglas, 2021. "Structural Budget Balance as a Fiscal Rule in the European Union—Good, Bad, or Ugly?," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(1), pages 121-141, March.

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