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A Single EU Seat in the IMF?

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  • Lorenzo Bini Smaghi

Abstract

This article examines the rationale for consolidating EU Member States' position in the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although a substantial amount of co‐ordination already takes place, particularly on issues related to the euro area and the single monetary and exchange rate policy, co‐operation between EU countries in the IMF remains a relatively new phenomenon and divergences still prevail. The current institutional set‐up, whereby the 15 EU countries are spread in nine constituencies, undermines effectiveness. Al though there is scope for further improving co‐operation, there are natural limits to what can be achieved within the existing co‐operation frame work. A single EU constituency would enable EU Member States to have a strong impact on IMF policies, potentially as strong as that of the US. However, this may not be an objective for all EU countries in the current conjuncture.

Suggested Citation

  • Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, 2004. "A Single EU Seat in the IMF?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 229-248, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:42:y:2004:i:2:p:229-248
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2004.00486.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Ludger Schuknecht, 2005. "What does the European Union do?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 275-319, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. David Howarth & Lucia Quaglia, 2015. "The political economy of the euro area's sovereign debt crisis: introduction to the special issue of the Review of International Political Economy," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(3), pages 457-484, June.
    2. Mario Sarcinelli, 2004. "The new financial architecture: from substantive to procedural rules," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 57(231), pages 337-363.
    3. Leech, Dennis & Leech, Robert, "undated". "Voting Power Implications of a Unified European Representation at the IMF," Economic Research Papers 269614, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    4. Géraldine Mahieu & Dirk Ooms & Stéphane Rottier, 2005. "Forum Section: EU Representation and the Governance of the International Monetary Fund," European Union Politics, , vol. 6(4), pages 493-510, December.
    5. Leech, Dennis & Leech, Robert, 2009. "Reforming IMF and World Bank governance : in search of simplicity, transparency and democratic legitimacy in the voting rules," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 914, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    6. Barry Eichengreen, 2019. "The international financial implications of Brexit," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 37-50, March.
    7. Buti, Marco & Giudice, Gabriele & Leandro, José (ed.), 2020. "Strengthening the Institutional Architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union," Vox eBooks, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number p331, December.
    8. Leech, Dennis & Leech, Robert, 2005. "Voting Power Implications of a Unified European Representation at the IMF," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 720, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    9. Loeper, Antoine, 2011. "Coordination in heterogeneous federal systems," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 900-912, August.
    10. Christian B. Jensen & Jonathan Slapin & Thomas König, 2007. "Who Calls for a Common EU Foreign Policy?," European Union Politics, , vol. 8(3), pages 387-410, September.
    11. Rauh, Christian, 2025. "International recognition of European Union “actorness”: Language-based evidence from United Nations general debate speeches 1970–2020," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 51(5), pages 792-821.
    12. Mario Sarcinelli, 2004. "The new financial architecture: from substantive to procedural rules," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 57(231), pages 337-363.
    13. Leech, Dennis & Leech, Robert, 2009. "Reforming IMF and World Bank governance : in search of simplicity, transparency and democratic legitimacy in the voting rules," Economic Research Papers 271286, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    14. Alan Ahearne & Jean Pisani-Ferry & Andre Sapir & Nicolas Veron, 2008. "The EU and the governance of globalisation," International Journal of Public Policy, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 3(1/2), pages 118-139.
    15. C. Randall Henning, 2011. "Coordinating Regional and Multilateral Financial Institutions," Working Paper Series WP11-9, Peterson Institute for International Economics.

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