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Why Some Firms Use Collar Offers in Mergers

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  • Kathleen P. Fuller

Abstract

Collar offers are merger offers using all stock as the method–of–payment that specify a range within which the bidder's price can fluctuate. In this paper the wealth effects associated with collar offers are determined, and cross–sectional regressions are employed to determine if this offer type is a significant determinant of abnormal returns. Results indicate that collar offers are associated with significantly positive abnormal returns for the target firm, even greater than those of firms receiving cash offers, but significantly negative returns for the bidder. These results raise an interesting question: why do some bidders make collar offers? Since the immediate wealth gains are strictly for the target and bidders making collar offers have returns insignificantly different than those making fixed stock offers, bidders must be utilizing collar offers for non–wealth related reasons. Using existing theories regarding the method–of–payment choice, various hypotheses for why firms may make collar offers are presented and tested using a multinomial logit analysis. The choice of collar offers seems to be significantly tied to the relative size of the merger, uncertainty regarding the bidder's value, and the target's and bidder's pre–merger insider ownership percentages.

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  • Kathleen P. Fuller, 2003. "Why Some Firms Use Collar Offers in Mergers," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 38(1), pages 127-150, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:finrev:v:38:y:2003:i:1:p:127-150
    DOI: 10.1111/1540-6288.00038
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    Cited by:

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    2. David J. Denis & Antonio J. Macias, 2010. "Material Adverse Change Clauses and Acquisition Dynamics," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1242, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    3. J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier & Albert Yoon, 2014. "Trial and Settlement: A Study of High-Low Agreements," NBER Working Papers 19873, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Hsieh, Jim & Walkling, Ralph A., 2005. "Determinants and implications of arbitrage holdings in acquisitions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 605-648, September.
    5. Ephraim Kwashie Thompson & Changki Kim, 2020. "Post-M&A Performance and Failure: Implications of Time until Deal Completion," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(7), pages 1-31, April.
    6. M. Andrew Fields & Phyllis Y. Keys, 2003. "The Emergence of Corporate Governance from Wall St. to Main St.: Outside Directors, Board Diversity, Earnings Management, and Managerial Incentives to Bear Risk," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 38(1), pages 1-24, February.
    7. Ismail, Ahmad & Krause, Andreas, 2010. "Determinants of the method of payment in mergers and acquisitions," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 471-484, November.

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