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Bipartisan Firms

Author

Listed:
  • Emanuele Caggiano
  • Lorenzo Rocco

Abstract

Corporate donations significantly shape the landscape of US presidential elections, yet we have a limited understanding of how firms' internal finances and external political risks influence these contributions. Using a data set that merges firm‐level information with campaign records from 1992 to 2020, we analyze the propensity, intensity, and distribution of corporate giving between parties. We find that while companies often employ a bipartisan donation strategy, they consistently exhibit a stronger preference for Republican candidates. We further show that escalating political polarization is associated with a 2% increase in the likelihood of donating and a 21.8% rise in total contributions, especially among non‐research‐oriented sectors. These patterns underscore the importance of both financial imperatives and broader political incentives in driving firms' campaign finance decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Emanuele Caggiano & Lorenzo Rocco, 2026. "Bipartisan Firms," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(1), pages 18-45, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:38:y:2026:i:1:p:18-45
    DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.70010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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