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Switzerland: Growth Of Government, Growth Of Centralisation

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  • Victoria Curzon Price

Abstract

Switzerland has a tradition of decentralised government, decentralised tax setting and direct reference to the voters through referendums. Such mechanisms should give rise to lower taxes, better provision of public goods and higher economic growth. However, these mechanisms have not been effective in the last 30 years at preventing the growth in government spending and centralisation. This is partly because of the consensus in favour of centralisation that exists among institutionalised politicians. The performance of the Swiss economy since 1970 has consequently been dismal. Real per capita post‐tax incomes have been stagnant. There is now an opportunity for the growth of centralisation to be reversed.

Suggested Citation

  • Victoria Curzon Price, 2004. "Switzerland: Growth Of Government, Growth Of Centralisation," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(2), pages 30-36, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecaffa:v:24:y:2004:i:2:p:30-36
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0270.2004.00470.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Kirchgassner, Gebhard & Pommerehne, Werner W., 1996. "Tax harmonization and tax competition in the European Union: Lessons from Switzerland," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 351-371, June.
    3. Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-664, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Samuel Gregg, 2010. "Wilhelm Röpke’s Political Economy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13360.

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