IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/devpol/v41y2023is2ne12745.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Aid is not development: The true character of Pacific aid

Author

Listed:
  • Dame Meg Taylor
  • Solstice Middleby

Abstract

Motivation You need not look far to read stories extolling the virtues, promises, and achievements of aid to the Pacific, but such stories are far from lived experience or empirical reality. There are other often silenced stories, stories that need to be heard. They speak of broken promises and obfuscation, oppressive bureaucratic conditions, and private contractors competing for profit off the back of the Pacific's poor and vulnerable people. Purpose This article seeks to uncover something of the true character of aid, how it has changed (over the past decade) and how donors, their intermediaries, and Pacific recipients have responded. Methods and approach We use our ethnographic and auto‐ethnographic insights to explore repressed stories; insights drawn from seven decades of collective experiences and observations of Australian aid, Australia being the region's largest and most significant donor. Findings We see three clear shifts in Australian aid over the last decade: (1) aid has become more politicized, deployed to support Australian interests; (2) aid has been increasingly privatized as much of the aid has been spent through four large Australian and international corporations—with local Pacific companies marginalized; and (3) aid has been increasingly contested by the peoples of the Pacific. Such changes have encouraged donors to tighten their grip on power. They have encouraged intermediaries to act as their agents, performing high levels of “interpretive labour.” They compete for donor custom and favour. Recipients of aid have been left with few options: they can comply with donors, thanking them for their generosity. They may resent the way they have been stripped of agency, perhaps looking to China for a different relationship. Aid of this character is not development. Rather, it is an unchecked donor‐driven system, beset by excessive power and control to benefit the system and its agents. Such aid may result in some success, but it systematically fails to empower Pacific agency and to reduce aid dependency. Policy implications A magnitude of change is required. We recommend more space for reflection on the lived experience of aid and on those generative, transformative initiatives occurring outside the aid system. We urge recipients of aid to take responsibility for development; to demand reform to see platitudes around listening, respect, and partnership become something more than words on a page; to ensure aid invests in long‐term development aligned to Pacific plans and priorities on Pacific terms—or to reject aid outright.

Suggested Citation

  • Dame Meg Taylor & Solstice Middleby, 2023. "Aid is not development: The true character of Pacific aid," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 41(S2), December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:devpol:v:41:y:2023:i:s2:n:e12745
    DOI: 10.1111/dpr.12745
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12745
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/dpr.12745?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Melita Lazell & Ivica Petrikova, 2020. "Is development aid securitized? Evidence from a cross‐country examination of aid commitments," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 38(3), pages 323-343, May.
    2. Alesina, Alberto & Dollar, David, 2000. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 33-63, March.
    3. Eric Neumayer, 2005. "Is the Allocation of Food Aid Free from Donor Interest Bias?," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(3), pages 394-411.
    4. William Easterly, 2002. "The cartel of good intentions: The problem of bureaucracy in foreign aid," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(4), pages 223-250.
    5. Ilyana Kuziemko & Eric Werker, 2006. "How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(5), pages 905-930, October.
    6. de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno & Smith, Alastair, 2009. "A Political Economy of Aid," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 309-340, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Axel Dreher & Andreas Fuchs, 2015. "Rogue aid? An empirical analysis of China's aid allocation," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(3), pages 988-1023, August.
    2. Fuchs, Andreas & Vadlamannati, Krishna Chaitanya, 2013. "The Needy Donor: An Empirical Analysis of India’s Aid Motives," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 110-128.
    3. Stubbs, Thomas H. & Kentikelenis, Alexander E. & King, Lawrence P., 2016. "Catalyzing Aid? The IMF and Donor Behavior in Aid Allocation," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 511-528.
    4. Jan Fałkowski, 2018. "U.S. food aid and American exports to recipient countries during the Cold War," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 49(5), pages 659-668, September.
    5. Broich, Tobias, 2017. "Do authoritarian regimes receive more Chinese development finance than democratic ones? Empirical evidence for Africa," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 180-207.
    6. Angelika J. Budjan & Andreas Fuchs, 2021. "Democracy and Aid Donorship," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 217-238, November.
    7. Acht, Martin & Omar Mahmoud, Toman & Thiele, Rainer, 2014. "Corrupt governments receive less bilateral aid: Governance and the delivery of foreign aid through non-government actors," Kiel Working Papers 1901, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    8. Ryan Cardwell & Pascal L. Ghazalian, 2020. "The Effects of Untying International Food Assistance: The Case of Canada," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 102(4), pages 1056-1078, August.
    9. Minasyan, Anna, 2018. "US aid, US educated leaders and economic ideology," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 244-257.
    10. Huanhuan Zheng & Chen Li, 2022. "Can money buy friendship?—Evidence from the US and China’s competition for influence through foreign aid," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(10), pages 3224-3245, October.
    11. Toke S. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk, 2019. "Foreign in influence and domestic policy: A survey," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1928, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    12. Asmus, Gerda & Eichenauer, Vera & Fuchs, Andreas & Parks, Bradley, 2021. "Does India use development finance to compete with China? A subnational analysis," Kiel Working Papers 2189, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    13. Kim, Nam Kyu & Kroeger, Alex, 2017. "Rewarding the introduction of multiparty elections," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 164-181.
    14. Bodenstein, Thilo & Kemmerling, Achim, 2015. "A Paradox of Redistribution in International Aid? The Determinants of Poverty-Oriented Development Assistance," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 359-369.
    15. Axel Dreher & Peter Nunnenkamp & Maya Schmaljohann, 2015. "The Allocation of German Aid: Self-interest and Government Ideology," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 160-184, March.
    16. Axel Dreher & Andreas Fuchs, 2011. "Rogue Aid? The Determinants of China’s Aid Allocation," Working Papers CEB 11-035, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    17. Fuchs, Andreas & Klann, Nils-Hendrik, 2013. "Emergency Aid 2.0," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79898, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    18. Broich, Tobias, 2017. "Do authoritarian regimes receive more Chinese development finance than democratic ones? Empirical evidence for Africa," MERIT Working Papers 2017-011, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    19. Baydag, Rena Melis & Klingebiel, Stephan & Marschall, Paul, 2018. "Shaping the patterns of aid allocation: a comparative analysis of seven bilateral donors and the European Union," IDOS Discussion Papers 22/2018, German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).
    20. Andreas Fuchs & Hannes Öhler, 2021. "Does private aid follow the flag? An empirical analysis of humanitarian assistance," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 671-705, March.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:devpol:v:41:y:2023:i:s2:n:e12745. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/odioruk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.