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Does NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) Chapter 19 make a difference? Dispute settlement and the incentive structure of U.S./Canada unfair trade petitions

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  • K. Jones

Abstract

NAFTA Chapter 19 sets up bilateral review panels to replace the domestic judicial appeals process of resolving disputes among NAFTA members over the enforcement of unfair trade laws. In principle, such panels can change the incentive structure of filing unfair trade law petitions by reducing the likelihood of an affirmative finding of injurious unfair trade. Using data from U.S. and Canadian unfair trade petition filings, empirical tests show support for this hypothesis. However, a more comprehensive settlement of conflicts will require progressive legal integration, including an extension of national treatment measures to alleged “unfair trade” that is not currently envisaged under the NAFTA.

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  • K. Jones, 2000. "Does NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) Chapter 19 make a difference? Dispute settlement and the incentive structure of U.S./Canada unfair trade petitions," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(2), pages 145-158, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:18:y:2000:i:2:p:145-158
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.2000.tb00013.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomas J. Prusa, 2021. "Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Thomas J Prusa (ed.), Economic Effects of Antidumping, chapter 2, pages 1-20, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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    Cited by:

    1. Gunning-Trant, Caroline & Carter, Colin A., 2003. "Trade Remedy Laws And Nafta Agricultural Trade," Working Papers 11962, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    2. Thomas J. Prusa & Robert Teh, 2010. "Protection Reduction and Diversion: PTAs and the Incidence of Antidumping Disputes," NBER Working Papers 16276, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Bruce A. Blonigen, 2006. "Evolving discretionary practices of U.S. antidumping activity," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(3), pages 874-900, August.
    4. Teh, Robert & Prusa, Thomas J. & Budetta, Michele, 2007. "Trade remedy provisions in regional trade agreements," WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2007-03, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.

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