Transfer Pricing – a Fiscal Issue
Lately a frequently used practice to reduce fiscal costs is the commercial transactios of products between subsidiaries of multi-national entities depending on their actual purposes or strategic objectives. In this context an important role in policy’s of such companies have methods available for pricing transfer. Even a relatively late entrant into economical practice, transfer pricing has rapidly emerged because more than a half of global transactions are conducted through multinational companies. In this paper we intend to present some of the situations where use transfer pricing, the consequences of their practice and their fixing methods on the basis of the strategic objectives of companies.
Volume (Year): 1 (2008)
Issue (Month): 36 (May)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 004 0251 411317
Fax: 004 0251 411317
Web page: http://feaa.ucv.ro/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nielsen, Søren Bo & Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis & Schjederup, Guttorm, 2000.
"Formula Apportionment And Transfer Pricing Under Oligopolistic Competition,"
18-2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
- S¯ren Bo Nielsen & Pascalis Raimondos-M¯ller & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2003. "Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 419-437, 04.
- Søren Bo Nielsen & Pascalis Raimondos-Møller & Guttorm Schjelderup, . "Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition," EPRU Working Paper Series 01-05, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Søren Bo Nielsen & Pascalis Raimondos-Møller & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2001. "Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 491, CESifo Group Munich.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aio:aucsse:v:1:y:2008:i:36:p:169-176. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anca Bandoi)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.