IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ags/polgne/355600.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Monopolizacja poprzez wykup przedsiębiorstw

Author

Listed:
  • Prokop, Jacek

Abstract

The author examines the possibility of monopolization in a sector dominated by three enterprises through the purchase of rival businesses—assuming there are no limitations imposed by the antimonopoly office. The analysis involved two monopolization models: static and dynamic, assuming that a single buyer will seek to monopolize the sector. Unlike in other models described in literature to date, the author assumes that the owners of companies subject to acquisition use mixed strategies in their decisions on selling their enterprises. In the static model, the author says, monopolization through acquisition may prove to be profitable. However, a dynamic analysis of the issue shows that the expected profit may be much smaller than suggested by static analyses and may fail to cover the permanent costs linked with the process of acquisition. Moreover, the probability of selling an enterprise by its owner is close to zero, which puts a question mark over the possibility of conducting effective monopolization through acquisition.

Suggested Citation

  • Prokop, Jacek, 2005. "Monopolizacja poprzez wykup przedsiębiorstw," Gospodarka Narodowa-The Polish Journal of Economics, Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie / SGH Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 2005(9), September.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:polgne:355600
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.355600
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/355600/files/Prokop.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.355600?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Harris, Ellie G, 1994. "Why One Firm Is the Target and the Other the Bidder in Single-Bidder, Synergistic Takeovers," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(2), pages 263-280, April.
    2. Morton I. Kamien & Israel Zang, 1990. "The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(2), pages 465-499.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Prokop, Jacek, 2005. "Monopolization through acquisition," MPRA Paper 43683, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2006.
    2. Jacek Prokop, 2009. "Monopolisation of triopoly – revisited," International Journal of Computational Economics and Econometrics, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 1(2), pages 113-125.
    3. Matthias Krakel, 2005. "On the Benefits of Withholding Knowledge in Organizations," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(2), pages 193-209.
    4. Horn, Henrik & Persson, Lars, 2001. "Endogenous mergers in concentrated markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1213-1244, September.
    5. Nilssen, Tore & Sorgard, Lars, 1998. "Sequential horizontal mergers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(9), pages 1683-1702, November.
    6. N. Kohers & T. Kohers, 2004. "Information sensitivity of high tech industries: evidence from merger announcements," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(7), pages 525-536.
    7. Gonzalez-Maestre, Miguel & Lopez-Cunat, Javier, 2001. "Delegation and mergers in oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1263-1279, September.
    8. Persson, Lars & Norbäck, Pehr-Johan, 2002. "Investment Liberalization - Who Benefits from Cross Border Mergers," CEPR Discussion Papers 3166, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2013. "Wage Bargaining And Merger Incentives With Asymmetric Costs," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65, pages 56-84, May.
    10. Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2004. "The incentives for takeover in oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(8-9), pages 1067-1089, November.
    11. Benchekroun, Hassan & Breton, Michèle & Chaudhuri, Amrita Ray, 2019. "Mergers in nonrenewable resource oligopolies and environmental policies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 35-52.
    12. Ray Chaudhuri, A., 2008. "A Dynamic Model of Endogenous Mergers and Trade Liberalization," Discussion Paper 2008-005, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    13. Pierre Lasserre & Moez Souissi, 2007. "It Takes Two to Tango. La fusion : exercice de deux options réelles," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 178(2), pages 51-65.
    14. Stiebale, Joel, 2016. "Cross-border M&As and innovative activity of acquiring and target firms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 1-15.
    15. Joel Stiebale & Michaela Trax, 2011. "The effects of cross‐border M&As on the acquirers’ domestic performance: firm‐level evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 44(3), pages 957-990, August.
    16. Dockner, Engelbert J. & Gaunersdorfer, Andrea, 2001. "On the profitability of horizontal mergers in industries with dynamic competition," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 195-216, August.
    17. Didier Laussel, 2024. "Sequential Mergers and Delayed Monopolization in Triopoly," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 223-252, March.
    18. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Sorgard, Lars, 1997. "Merger and product range rivalry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 21-42, November.
    19. Amrita Ray Chaudhuri, 2014. "Cross-Border Mergers and Market Segmentation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 229-257, June.
    20. Lars-Hendrik Röller & Johan Stennek & Frank Verboven, 2006. "Efficiency Gains from Mergers," Chapters, in: Fabienne IIzkovitz & Roderick Meiklejohn (ed.), European Merger Control, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Production Economics;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:polgne:355600. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/irsghpl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.