Monopolization through acquisitions in a differentiated product industry
This article analyzes the incentive to merge in a context of price competition with horizontal product differentiation. In contrast to the results obtained by Kamien and Zang (1990), we show that merged equilibria can appear in this game. Moreover monopolization of the industry occurs with a high number of firms.
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- Ziss, Steffen, 2001. "Horizontal mergers and delegation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 471-492, March.
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- Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Economics Working Papers 8880, University of California at Berkeley.
- Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt0tp305nx, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
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"Delegation and mergers in oligopoly,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1263-1279, September.
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"Competing vertical structures : precommitment and renegotiation,"
CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange)
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- Morton I. Kamien & Israel Zang, 1990. "The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(2), pages 465-499.
- Stephen W. Salant & Sheldon Switzer & Robert J. Reynolds, 1983. "Losses From Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-199.
- Häckner, Jonas, 1999.
"A Note on Price and Quantity Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies,"
Research Papers in Economics
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- Hackner, Jonas, 2000. "A Note on Price and Quantity Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 233-239, August.
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