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Susan C. Athey: John Bates Clark Award Winner 2007

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  • John Roberts

Abstract

Susan Carleton Athey is the 2007 recipient of the American Economic Association's John Bates Clark Medal, which is "awarded biennially to that American economist under the age of forty who is adjudged to have made the most significant contribution to economic thought and knowledge." I have had the immense pleasure of being Susan's teacher, her advisor, her coauthor, and her friend. Yet I never cease to be amazed at her abilities and her accomplishments on so many dimensions. The AEA specifically cited her work in four distinct areas: monotone information models; industrial organization and particularly auctions; macroeconomics; and econometrics. Yet there is even more breadth to Susan's research contributions than this suggests, as I will show.

Suggested Citation

  • John Roberts, 2008. "Susan C. Athey: John Bates Clark Award Winner 2007," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 22(4), pages 181-198, Fall.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:22:y:2008:i:4:p:181-98
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.22.4.181
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    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.22.4.181
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David McAdams, 2003. "Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(4), pages 1191-1214, July.
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    5. Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-180, January.
    6. Philip J. Reny, 2011. "On the Existence of Monotone Pure‐Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(2), pages 499-553, March.
    7. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    8. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    9. Philip J. Reny & Shmuel Zamir, 2004. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(4), pages 1105-1125, July.
    10. Donald M. Topkis, 1978. "Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 26(2), pages 305-321, April.
    11. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    • B31 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - Individuals

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