IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v99y2009i4p1576-87.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Learning about the Future and Dynamic Efficiency

Author

Listed:
  • Alex Gershkov
  • Benny Moldovanu

Abstract

We study an allocation problem where a set of objects needs to be allocated to agents arriving over time. The basic model is of the private, independent values type. The dynamically efficient allocation is implementable if the distribution of agents' values is known. Whereas lack of knowledge about the distribution is inconsequential in the static case, endogenous informational externalities arise if the designer gradually learns about the distribution by observing present values. These externalities may prevent the implementation of the dynamically efficient allocation. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the efficient allocation to be implementable. (JEL D11, D82)

Suggested Citation

  • Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu, 2009. "Learning about the Future and Dynamic Efficiency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1576-1587, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:4:p:1576-87
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.4.1576
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.99.4.1576
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. “Learning About the Future and Dynamic Efficiency,” A. Gershkov & B. Moldovanu (2009)
      by afinetheorem in A Fine Theorem on 2012-08-20 13:49:01
    2. “Learning About the Future and Dynamic Efficiency,” A. Gershkov & B. Moldovanu (2009)
      by afinetheorem in A Fine Theorem on 2012-08-20 13:49:01

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Maher Said, 2010. "Dynamic Auctions: A Survey," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000035, David K. Levine.
    2. Gershkov, Alex & Moldovanu, Benny, 2012. "Optimal search, learning and implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 881-909.
    3. repec:spr:joecth:v:64:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00199-016-0993-0 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Deb, Rahul & Said, Maher, 2015. "Dynamic screening with limited commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 891-928.
    5. Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2013. "Markovian assignment rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 1-25, January.
    6. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
    7. Mierendorff, Konrad, 2016. "Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 190-222.
    8. Mierendorff, Konrad, 2013. "The Dynamic Vickrey Auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 192-204.
    9. Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam, 2015. "Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 45-76.
    10. Gershkov, Alex & Moldovanu, Benny, 2013. "Non-Bayesian optimal search and dynamic implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 121-125.
    11. Kruse, Thomas & Strack, Philipp, 2015. "Optimal stopping with private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 702-727.
    12. Huo, Jingjing, 2015. "How Nations Innovate: The Political Economy of Technological Innovation in Affluent Capitalist Economies," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198735847.
    13. Babaioff, Moshe & Blumrosen, Liad & Roth, Aaron, 2015. "Auctions with online supply," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 227-246.
    14. Gershkov, Alex & Moldovanu, Benny, 2012. "Dynamic allocation and pricing: A mechanism design approach," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 283-286.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:4:p:1576-87. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael P. Albert). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.