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The Administrative Foundations of Self-Enforcing Constitutions

Author

Listed:
  • Yadira Gonzalez de Lara
  • Avner Greif
  • Saumitra Jha

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Yadira Gonzalez de Lara & Avner Greif & Saumitra Jha, 2008. "The Administrative Foundations of Self-Enforcing Constitutions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 105-109, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:2:p:105-09
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.2.105
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. P. Buonanno & M. Cervellati & S. Lazzaroni & G. Prarolo, 2022. "Historical social contracts and their legacy: a disaggregated analysis of the medieval republics," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 485-526, December.
    2. Daniel J. Smith, 2020. "Turn-taking in office," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 205-226, June.
    3. Charron, Nicholas & Dahlström, Carl & Lapuente, Victor, 2012. "No law without a state," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 176-193.
    4. Alberto Bisin & Jared Rubin & Avner Seror & Thierry Verdier, 2021. "Culture, Institutions & the Long Divergence," NBER Working Papers 28488, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Andrew T. Young, 2015. "Hospitalitas," Working Papers 15-41, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    6. Alberto Bisin & Jared Rubin & Avner Seror & Thierry Verdier, 2024. "Culture, institutions and the long divergence," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 1-40, March.
    7. Daniel J. Smith & George R. Crowley & J. Sebastian Leguizamon, 2021. "Long live the doge? Death as a term limit on Venetian chief executives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(3), pages 333-359, September.
    8. Salter, Alexander William & Young, Andrew T., 2018. "A theory of self-enforcing monetary constitutions with reference to the Suffolk System, 1825–1858," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 13-22.
    9. Charles Angelucci & Simone Meraglia, 2015. "Trade, Law and Order, and Political Liberties: Theory and Application to English Medieval Boroughs," Discussion Papers 1509, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    10. Diego Puga & Daniel Trefler, 2014. "International Trade and Institutional Change: Medieval Venice’s Response to Globalization," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 129(2), pages 753-821.
    11. Young, Andrew T., 2018. "Hospitalitas: Barbarian settlements and constitutional foundations of medieval Europe," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(4), pages 715-737, August.
    12. Andrew T. Young, 2016. "What does it take for a roving bandit settle down? Theory and an illustrative history of the Visigoths," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(1), pages 75-102, July.
    13. Tarabar, Danko & Young, Andrew T., 2021. "What constitutes a constitutional amendment culture?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    14. Masciandaro, Donato & Goodhart, Charles & Ugolini, Stefano, 2021. "Pandemic recession and helicopter money: Venice, 1629–1631," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 28(3), pages 300-318, December.
    15. Alexander William Salter & Andrew T. Young, 2018. "Medieval representative assemblies: collective action and antecedents of limited government," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 171-192, June.
    16. Andrew T. Young, 2019. "How Austrians can contribute to constitutional political economy (and why they should)," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 32(4), pages 281-293, December.
    17. Ma, Debin & Rubin, Jared, 2019. "The Paradox of Power: Principal-agent problems and administrative capacity in Imperial China (and other absolutist regimes)," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 277-294.
    18. Alexander Salter, 2015. "Sovereignty as exchange of political property rights," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(1), pages 79-96, October.
    19. Angelucci, Charles & Meraglia, Simone, 2013. "Trade, Self-Governance,and the Provision of Law and Order, with an Application To Medieval English Chartered Towns," TSE Working Papers 13-443, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    20. Humphreys, Macartan & de la Sierra, Raúl Sánchez & der Windt, Peter Van, 2019. "Exporting democratic practices: Evidence from a village governance intervention in Eastern Congo," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 140, pages 279-301.
    21. Humphreys, Macartan & Sánchez de la Sierra, Raúl & Van der Windt, Peter, 2019. "Exporting democratic practices: Evidence from a village governance intervention in Eastern Congo," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 279-301.
    22. Justin T. Callais & Andrew T. Young, 2024. "Revolutionary Constitutions: are they revolutionary in terms of constitutional design?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(3), pages 423-455, September.
    23. Charles Angelucci & Simone Meraglia & Nico Voigtländer, 2017. "How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments: From the Norman Conquest of England to the Great Reform Act," NBER Working Papers 23606, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    24. Jha, Saumitra, 2008. "Shares, Coalition Formation and Political Development: Evidence from Seventeenth Century England," Research Papers 2005, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913

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