Welfare-Improving Health Expenditure Subsidies
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- Jack, William & Levinson, Arik & Rahardja, Sjamsu, 2006.
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- William Jack (Georgetown University), Arik Levinson (Georgetown University), and Sjamsu Rahardja (World Bank), 2005. "Employee cost-sharing and the welfare effects of Flexible Spending Accounts," Working Papers gueconwpa~05-05-12, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
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- Jack, W., 1998. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Ex Ante Adverse Slection and Ex Post Moral Hazard," Papers 340, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
- Jaspersen, Johannes G. & Richter, Andreas, 2015. "The wealth effects of premium subsidies on moral hazard in insurance markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 139-153.
- Steven Pizer & Austin Frakt & Roger Feldman, 2009. "Nothing for something? Estimating cost and value for beneficiaries from recent medicare spending increases on HMO payments and drug benefits," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 59-81, March.
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- Asheim, Geir B. & Emblem, Anne Wenche & Nilssen, Tore, 2010. "Health insurance: Medical treatment vs disability payment," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 137-145, September.
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