IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v107y2017i5p251-55.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Econometrics and Some Properties of Separable Matching Models

Author

Listed:
  • Alfred Galichon
  • Bernard Salanié

Abstract

We present a class of one-to-one matching models with perfectly transferable utility. We discuss identification and inference in these separable models, and we show how their comparative statics are readily analyzed.

Suggested Citation

  • Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salanié, 2017. "The Econometrics and Some Properties of Separable Matching Models," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(5), pages 251-255, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:5:p:251-55
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171113
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.p20171113
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrieve=WRFzQhNfcdytt3f9-NOwbfIYWJlevlEn
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eugene Choo & Aloysius Siow, 2006. "Who Marries Whom and Why," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(1), pages 175-201, February.
    2. Decker, Colin & Lieb, Elliott H. & McCann, Robert J. & Stephens, Benjamin K., 2013. "Unique equilibria and substitution effects in a stochastic model of the marriage market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 778-792.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Adda, Jérôme & Pinotti, Paolo & Tura, Giulia, 2020. "There's More to Marriage than Love: The Effect of Legal Status and Cultural Distance on Intermarriages and Separations," CEPR Discussion Papers 14432, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Bisin, Alberto & Tura, Giulia, 2019. "Marriage, Fertility, and Cultural Integration in Italy," CEPR Discussion Papers 14179, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Pierre-Andr'e Chiappori & Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salani'e, 2021. "On Human Capital and Team Stability," Papers 2102.06487, arXiv.org.
    4. Bryan S. Graham, 2019. "Network Data," NBER Working Papers 26577, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Baiyu Dong & Yu-Wei Hsieh & Xing Zhang, 2022. "Implementing Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Empirical Matching Models," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 59(1), pages 1-32, January.
    6. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Fioro, Carlo & Galichon, Alfred & Verzillo, Stefano, 2022. "Assortative Matching on Income," Working Papers 2022-07, Joint Research Centre, European Commission.
    7. Alberto Bisin & Giulia Tura, 2019. "Marriage, Fertility, and Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Italy," Working Papers 2019-063, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    8. Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salani'e, 2021. "Cupid's Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models," Papers 2106.02371, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
    9. Bryan S. Graham, 2019. "Network Data," CeMMAP working papers CWP71/19, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Baiyu Dong & Yu-Wei Hsieh & Xing Zhang, 2022. "Implementing Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Empirical Matching Models," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 59(1), pages 1-32, January.
    2. Arnaud Dupuy & Alfred Galichon, 2014. "Personality Traits and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(6), pages 1271-1319.
    3. Augsburg, Britta & Baquero, Juan P. & Gautam, Sanghmitra & Rodriguez-Lesmes, Paul, 2023. "Sanitation and marriage markets in India: Evidence from the Total Sanitation Campaign," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    4. Marion Goussé & Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Marc Robin, 2016. "Marriage, Labor Supply, and Home Production: A Longitudinal Microeconomic Analysis of Marriage, Intra-Household Bargaining and Time Use Using the BHPS, 1991-2008," Cahiers de recherche 1601, CIRPEE.
    5. Marion Goussé & Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean‐Marc Robin, 2017. "Marriage, Labor Supply, and Home Production," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85(6), pages 1873-1919, November.
    6. Raicho Bolijov & Alfred Galichon, 2014. "Matching in Closed-Form: Equilibrium, identification, and comparative statics," Working Papers hal-01169654, HAL.
    7. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5qto0mb54p8u69nt9krvc2btjm is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Stephan Lauermann & Georg Nöldeke & Thomas Tröger, 2020. "The Balance Condition in Search‐and‐Matching Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 595-618, March.
    9. Augsburg, Britta & Baquero, Juan Pablo & Gautam, Sanghmitra & Rodriguez-Lesmes, Paul, 2021. "Sanitation and Marriage Markets in India: Evidence from the Total Sanitation Campaign," SocArXiv 58sdf, Center for Open Science.
    10. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/361levbcs399s9oa154em6h9jl is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Kuan‐Ming Chen & Yu‐Wei Hsieh & Ming‐Jen Lin, 2023. "Reducing Recommendation Inequality Via Two‐Sided Matching: A Field Experiment Of Online Dating," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(3), pages 1201-1221, August.
    12. Jaerim Choi, 2021. "Two-sided heterogeneity, endogenous sharing, and international matching markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(2), pages 473-509, September.
    13. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/34a8d5vcod96oo2cch2e7gs4v6 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Aloysius Siow, 2015. "Testing Becker's Theory of Positive Assortative Matching," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(2), pages 409-441.
    15. Lu, Di, 2018. "China’s Selective Two-Child Policy and Its Impact on the Marriage Market," VfS Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy 181586, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    16. Alfred Galichon & Simon Weber, 2024. "Matching under Imperfectly Transferable Utility," Papers 2403.05222, arXiv.org.
    17. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/7o52iohb7k6srk09mj4j5amb8 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Hortaçsu, Ali & Hwang, Sam Il Myoung & Mathur, Divya, 2019. "Monetary incentives on inter-caste marriages in India: Theory and evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    19. John K. Dagsvik & Zhiyang Jia, 2018. "Aggregate behavior in matching markets with flexible contracts and non-transferable representations of preferences," Discussion Papers 875, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    20. Doorley, Karina & Dupuy, Arnaud & Weber, Simon, 2019. "The empirical content of marital surplus in matching models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 51-54.
    21. Edoardo Ciscato & Alfred Galichon & Marion Goussé, 2020. "Like Attract Like? A Structural Comparison of Homogamy across Same-Sex and Different-Sex Households," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(2), pages 740-781.
    22. James Foreman-Peck & Peng Zhou, 2021. "Fertility versus productivity: a model of growth with evolutionary equilibria," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 34(3), pages 1073-1104, July.
    23. Arnaud Dupuy & Alfred Galichon, 2014. "Personality traits and the marriage market," SciencePo Working papers hal-03470458, HAL.
    24. Li, Li & Mak, Eric, 2016. "Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage: The Catalyst Effect of Unilateral Divorce," MPRA Paper 83330, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C57 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Econometrics of Games and Auctions
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:5:p:251-55. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.