Social Preferences under Risk: Equality of Opportunity versus Equality of Outcome
This paper axiomatizes a utility function for social preferences under risk. In the model, a single parameter captures a preference for equality of opportunity (i.e., equality of exante expected payoffs) relative to equality of outcome (i.e., equality of ex-post payoffs). In a deterministic environment, the model reduces to the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). The model is consistent with recent experiments on probabilistic dictator games.
Volume (Year): 103 (2013)
Issue (Month): 7 (December)
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- repec:hal:journl:halshs-00085940 is not listed on IDEAS
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