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The Scope of IMF Conditionality

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Cited by:

  1. Marchesi, Silvia & Sabani, Laura & Dreher, Axel, 2011. "Read my lips: The role of information transmission in multilateral reform design," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 86-98, May.
  2. Silvia Marchesi & Laura Sabani & Axel Dreher, 2009. "Agency and communicaton in IMF conditional lending: Theory and empirical evidence," KOF Working papers 09-218, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  3. Marchesi, Silvia, 2018. "Communication and performance in Bank–Fund joint participation," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 263-276.
  4. Stephanie J. Rickard & Teri L. Caraway, 2019. "International demands for austerity: Examining the impact of the IMF on the public sector," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 35-57, March.
  5. Axel Dreher & Stephan Klasen & James Raymond Vreeland & Eric Werker, 2013. "The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically Driven Aid Less Effective?," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(1), pages 157-191.
  6. Silva Marchesi & Laura Sabani & Axel Dreher, 2009. "Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence," Ibero America Institute for Econ. Research (IAI) Discussion Papers 183, Ibero-America Institute for Economic Research.
  7. Baccini, Leonardo & Urpelainen, Johannes, 2012. "Strategic side payments: preferential trading agreements, economic reform, and foreign aid," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 45057, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  8. Gibson, Clark C. & Hoffman, Barak D. & Jablonski, Ryan S., 2015. "Did Aid Promote Democracy in Africa? The Role of Technical Assistance in Africa’s Transitions," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 323-335.
  9. Reinsberg, Bernhard & Kern, Andreas & Rau-Göhring, Matthias, 2021. "The political economy of IMF conditionality and central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
  10. Presbitero, Andrea F. & Zazzaro, Alberto, 2012. "IMF Lending in Times of Crisis: Political Influences and Crisis Prevention," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(10), pages 1944-1969.
  11. Axel Dreher, 2009. "IMF conditionality: theory and evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 233-267, October.
  12. ., 2016. "Introduction and overview: the purposes and operations of the IMF," Chapters, in: The International Monetary Fund, chapter 1, pages 1-18, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  13. Sylvia Marchesi, 2010. "From Economic Crisis to Reform. IMF Programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 86(273), pages 304-307, June.
  14. Bernardo Guimaraes & Oz Iazdi, 2015. "IMF conditionalities, liquidity provision, and incentives for fiscal adjustment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(5), pages 705-722, October.
  15. repec:got:cegedp:123 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Silvia Marchesi & Laura Sabani, 2013. "Does it Take Two to Tango? Improving Cooperation between the IMF and the World Bank: Theory and Empirical Evidence," Development Working Papers 357, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.
  17. Randall Stone, 2013. "Informal governance in international organizations: Introduction to the special issue," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 121-136, June.
  18. Kilby, Christopher, 2015. "Assessing the impact of World Bank preparation on project outcomes," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 111-123.
  19. Axel Dreher & James Raymond Vreeland, 2011. "Buying Votes and International Organizations," Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers 78, Courant Research Centre PEG.
  20. Ayse Kaya & Byungwon Woo, 2022. "China and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB): Chinese Influence Over Membership Shares?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 781-813, October.
  21. Bernhard Reinsberg & Thomas Stubbs & Alexander Kentikelenis, 2022. "Compliance, defiance, and the dependency trap: International Monetary Fund program interruptions and their impact on capital markets," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(4), pages 1022-1041, October.
  22. Stubbs, Thomas H. & Kentikelenis, Alexander E. & King, Lawrence P., 2016. "Catalyzing Aid? The IMF and Donor Behavior in Aid Allocation," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 511-528.
  23. repec:bla:glopol:v:8:y:2017:i::p:102-112 is not listed on IDEAS
  24. Susanne Lütz & Matthias Kranke, 2010. "The European Rescue of the Washington Consensus? EU and IMF Lending to Central and Eastern European Countries," Europe in Question Discussion Paper Series of the London School of Economics (LEQs) 2, London School of Economics / European Institute.
  25. Klaus H. Goetz & Ronny Patz & Steffen Eckhard & Hylke Dijkstra, 2017. "Contested Implementation: The Unilateral Influence of Member States on Peacebuilding Policy in Kosovo," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 8(s5), pages 102-112, August.
  26. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & James Raymond Vreeland, 2010. "Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence IMF Conditionality?," KOF Working papers 10-262, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  27. Öhler, Hannes & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Dreher, Axel, 2012. "Does conditionality work? A test for an innovative US aid scheme," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 138-153.
  28. Susanne Lütz & Matthias Kranke, 2010. "The European Rescue of the Washington Consensus? EU and IMF Lending to Central and Eastern European Countries," LEQS – LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series 22, European Institute, LSE.
  29. Axel Dreher & Vera Eichenauer & Kai Gehring & Vera Z. Eichenauer, 2013. "Geopolitics, Aid and Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series 4299, CESifo.
  30. Minasyan, Anna, 2018. "US aid, US educated leaders and economic ideology," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 244-257.
  31. Humphrey, Chris & Michaelowa, Katharina, 2013. "Shopping for Development: Multilateral Lending, Shareholder Composition and Borrower Preferences," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 142-155.
  32. McLean, Elena V., 2023. "Looking for advice: The politics of consulting services procurement in the World Bank," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
  33. Christina L. Davis & Tyler Pratt, 2021. "The forces of attraction: How security interests shape membership in economic institutions," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 903-929, October.
  34. Rau-Goehring, Matthias & Reinsberg, Bernhard & Kern, Andreas, 2020. "The role of IMF conditionality for central bank independence," Working Paper Series 2464, European Central Bank.
  35. Thomas Stubbs & Bernhard Reinsberg & Alexander Kentikelenis & Lawrence King, 2020. "How to evaluate the effects of IMF conditionality," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 29-73, January.
  36. Glen Biglaiser & Karl DeRouen, 2011. "How soon is now? The effects of the IMF on economic reforms in Latin America," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 189-213, July.
  37. Essers, Dennis & Ide, Stefaan, 2019. "The IMF and precautionary lending: An empirical evaluation of the selectivity and effectiveness of the Flexible Credit Line," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 25-61.
  38. Ariel Akerman & João Paulo Pessoa & Leonardo Weller, 2022. "The West’s Teeth: IMF conditionality during the Cold War," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(7), pages 2034-2051, July.
  39. Rickard, Stephanie J. & Caraway, Teri L., 2019. "International demands for austerity: examining the impact of the IMF on the public sector," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86636, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  40. Gehring, Kai & Lang, Valentin, 2020. "Stigma or cushion? IMF programs and sovereign creditworthiness," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
  41. Bomprezzi, Pietro & Marchesi, Silvia, 2023. "A firm level approach on the effects of IMF programs," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
  42. Lang, Valentin F. & Presbitero, Andrea F., 2018. "Room for discretion? Biased decision-making in international financial institutions," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 1-16.
  43. Silvia Marchesi & Emanuela Sirtori, 2011. "Is two better than one? The effects of IMF and World Bank interaction on growth," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 287-306, September.
  44. Christopher Kilby, 2012. "Assessing the contribution of donor agencies to aid effectiveness: The impact of World Bank preparation on project outcomes," Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series 20, Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics.
  45. Diego Saravia, 2013. "Vulnerability, Crises and Debt Maturity: Do IMF Interventions Increase Reliance on Short-Term Debt?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 311-331, December.
  46. Axel Dreher & Vera Eichenauer & Kai Gehring & Vera Z. Eichenauer, 2013. "Geopolitics, Aid and Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series 4299, CESifo.
  47. Daniel McDowell, 2017. "Need for speed: The lending responsiveness of the IMF," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 39-73, March.
  48. Mr. Calixte Ahokpossi & Laurence Allain & Giovanna Bua, 2014. "A Constrained Choice? Impact of Concessionality Requirements on Borrowing Behavior," IMF Working Papers 2014/176, International Monetary Fund.
  49. Balima, Hippolyte W. & Sokolova, Anna, 2021. "IMF programs and economic growth: A meta-analysis," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
  50. Ali Burak Güven, 2012. "The IMF, the World Bank, and the Global Economic Crisis: Exploring Paradigm Continuity," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 43(4), pages 869-898, July.
  51. Dreher, Axel & Walter, Stefanie, 2010. "Does the IMF Help or Hurt? The Effect of IMF Programs on the Likelihood and Outcome of Currency Crises," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-18, January.
  52. Songying Fang & Erica Owen, 2011. "International institutions and credible commitment of non-democracies," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 141-162, July.
  53. Molly Bauer & Cesi Cruz & Benjamin Graham, 2012. "Democracies only: When do IMF agreements serve as a seal of approval?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 33-58, March.
  54. Baccini, Leonardo & Urpelainen, Johannes, 2014. "International institutions and domestic politics: can preferential trading agreements help leaders promote economic reform?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 55608, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  55. Nikitas Konstantinidis & Yannis Karagiannis, 2020. "Intrinsic vs. extrinsic incentives for reform: An informational mechanism of E(M)U conditionality," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 601-632, July.
  56. Reinsberg, Bernhard, 2015. "Foreign Aid Responses to Political Liberalization," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 46-61.
  57. Li, Larry & Sy, Malick & McMurray, Adela, 2015. "Insights into the IMF bailout debate: A review and research agenda," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 891-914.
  58. Elena V. McLean, 2017. "The politics of contract allocation in the World Bank," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 255-279, June.
  59. Timothy McKeown, 2009. "How U.S. decision-makers assessed their control of multilateral organizations, 1957–1982," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 269-291, September.
  60. Chletsos, Michael & Sintos, Andreas, 2021. "Hide and seek: IMF intervention and the shadow economy," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 292-319.
  61. Christopher Kilby & Katharina Michaelowa, 2019. "What Influences World Bank Project Evaluations?," Springer Books, in: Nabamita Dutta & Claudia R. Williamson (ed.), Lessons on Foreign Aid and Economic Development, chapter 0, pages 109-150, Springer.
  62. Julio Revuelta, 2021. "The Effects of the Economic Adjustment Programmes for Greece: A Quasi-Experimental Approach," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(9), pages 1-15, April.
  63. Andrea F. Presbitero & Alberto Zazzaro, 2010. "IMF Lending in Low- and Middle-Income Countries in the Wake of the Global Crisis," Development Working Papers 305, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.
  64. Valentin Lang, 2021. "The economics of the democratic deficit: The effect of IMF programs on inequality," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 599-623, July.
  65. Christopher Marcoux & Johannes Urpelainen, 2013. "Non-compliance by design: Moribund hard law in international institutions," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 163-191, June.
  66. Muhammet Bas & Randall Stone, 2014. "Adverse selection and growth under IMF programs," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 1-28, March.
  67. Forster, Timon & Kentikelenis, Alexander E. & Stubbs, Thomas H. & King, Lawrence P., 2020. "Globalization and health equity: The impact of structural adjustment programs on developing countries," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 267(C).
  68. Mark Copelovitch, 2014. "Michael Breen. 2013. The politics of IMF lending (New York: Palgrave MacMillan)," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 125-130, March.
  69. William N. Kring & Kevin P. Gallagher, 2019. "Strengthening the Foundations? Alternative Institutions for Finance and Development," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 50(1), pages 3-23, January.
  70. Strand, Jonathan R. & Zappile, Tina M., 2015. "Always Vote for Principle, Though You May Vote Alone: Explaining United States Political Support for Multilateral Development Loans," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 224-239.
  71. Kern, Andreas & Reinsberg, Bernhard & Rau-Göhring, Matthias, 2019. "IMF conditionality and central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 212-229.
  72. Martin Steinwand & Randall Stone, 2008. "The International Monetary Fund: A review of the recent evidence," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 123-149, June.
  73. Patrick Bayer & Christopher Marcoux & Johannes Urpelainen, 2014. "Choosing international organizations: When do states and the World Bank collaborate on environmental projects?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 413-440, December.
  74. Bumba Mukherjee & David Andrew Singer, 2010. "International Institutions and Domestic Compensation: The IMF and the Politics of Capital Account Liberalization," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(1), pages 45-60, January.
  75. Lauren L. Ferry & Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Christina J. Schneider, 2020. "Catch me if you care: International development organizations and national corruption," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 767-792, October.
  76. Jeffrey Chwieroth, 2013. "“The silent revolution:” How the staff exercise informal governance over IMF lending," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 265-290, June.
  77. Iasmin Goes, 2023. "Examining the effect of IMF conditionality on natural resource policy," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 227-285, March.
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