IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/spr/sprchp/978-3-030-22121-8_6.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

What Influences World Bank Project Evaluations?

In: Lessons on Foreign Aid and Economic Development

Author

Listed:
  • Christopher Kilby

    (Villanova University)

  • Katharina Michaelowa

    (University of Zurich)

Abstract

In 2011, the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group made its project ratings database public. With broad geographic and sectoral coverage, this database is a valuable resource for research on development effectiveness, what works and what does not. This chapter first provides an overview for scholars interested in evaluation but unfamiliar with the World Bank evaluation system. Next we examine whether geopolitical or institutional factors influence ratings. We focus on how projects are selected for performance assessments and what factors influence project ratings. We find evidence that bureaucratic factors influence selection and that one geopolitical variable—nonpermanent United Nations Security Council membership—impacts ratings. Nonetheless if researchers control for potential biases, World Bank project ratings can provide a valuable way to measure project quality in many applications.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher Kilby & Katharina Michaelowa, 2019. "What Influences World Bank Project Evaluations?," Springer Books, in: Nabamita Dutta & Claudia R. Williamson (ed.), Lessons on Foreign Aid and Economic Development, chapter 0, pages 109-150, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-22121-8_6
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-22121-8_6
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jonathan Isham & Daniel Kaufmann, 1999. "The Forgotten Rationale for Policy Reform: The Productivity of Investment Projects," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(1), pages 149-184.
    2. Dollar, David & Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural Adjustment Programmes?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(466), pages 894-917, October.
    3. Axel Dreher & Stephan Klasen & James Raymond Vreeland & Eric Werker, 2013. "The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically Driven Aid Less Effective?," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(1), pages 157-191.
    4. Fleck, Robert K. & Kilby, Christopher, 2010. "Changing aid regimes? U.S. foreign aid from the Cold War to the War on Terror," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 185-197, March.
    5. World Bank, 2011. "The World Bank Annual Report 2011 [Banco Mundial - informe anual 2011 : reseña del ejercicio]," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 2378, December.
    6. Kevin Morrison, 2013. "Membership no longer has its privileges: The declining informal influence of Board members on IDA lending," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 291-312, June.
    7. Dollar, David & Levin, Victoria, 2005. "Sowing and reaping: institutional quality and project outcomes in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3524, The World Bank.
    8. Geli,Patricia & Kraay,Aart C. & Nobakht,Hoveida, 2014. "Predicting World Bank project outcome ratings," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7001, The World Bank.
    9. Guillaumont, Patrick & Laajaj, Rachid, 2006. "When instability increases the effectiveness of aid projects," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4034, The World Bank.
    10. Moll, Peter & Geli, Patricia & Saavedra, Pablo, 2015. "Correlates of success in World Bank development policy lending," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7181, The World Bank.
    11. Blum, Jurgen Rene, 2014. "What factors predict how public sector projects perform ? a review of the World Bank's public sector management portfolio," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6798, The World Bank.
    12. Lisa Chauvet & Paul Collier & Andreas Fuster, 2015. "Supervision and Project Performance: A Principal-Agent Approach," Working Papers DT/2015/04, DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation).
    13. World Bank, 2014. "World Development Indicators 2014," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 18237, December.
    14. Limodio, Nicola, 2011. "The success of infrastructure projects in low-income countries and the role of selectivity," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5694, The World Bank.
    15. Katharina Michaelowa & Axel Borrmann, 2006. "Evaluation Bias and Incentive Structures in Bi‐ and Multilateral Aid Agencies," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 313-329, May.
    16. Denizer, Cevdet & Kaufmann, Daniel & Kraay, Aart, 2013. "Good countries or good projects? Macro and micro correlates of World Bank project performance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 288-302.
    17. Joao Pedro Azevedo, 2011. "WBOPENDATA: Stata module to access World Bank databases," Statistical Software Components S457234, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 09 Jul 2020.
    18. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2009. "Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 1-18, January.
    19. Chauvet, Lisa & Collier, Paul & Duponchel, Marguerite, 2010. "What explains aid project success in post-conflict situations ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5418, The World Bank.
    20. Kaufmann, Daniel & Wang, Yan, 1995. "Macroeconomic policies and project performance in the social sectors: A model of human capital production and evidence from LDCs," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 751-765, May.
    21. Lodewijk Smets & Stephen Knack & Nadia Molenaers, 2013. "Political ideology, quality at entry and the success of economic reform programs," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 447-476, December.
    22. Stone, Randall W., 2008. "The Scope of IMF Conditionality," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 589-620, October.
    23. Kilby, Christopher, 2015. "Assessing the impact of World Bank preparation on project outcomes," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 111-123.
    24. Patrick G. Grasso & Sulaiman S. Wasty & Rachel V. Weaving, 2003. "World Bank Operations Evaluation Department : The First 30 Years," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 15128, December.
    25. Mark T. Buntaine & Bradley C. Parks, 2013. "When Do Environmentally Focused Assistance Projects Achieve their Objectives? Evidence from World Bank Post-Project Evaluations," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 13(2), pages 65-88, May.
    26. Ralston, Laura, 2014. "Success in difficult environments : a portfolio analysis of fragile and conflict-affected states," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7098, The World Bank.
    27. Deininger, Klaus & Squire, Lyn & Basu, Swati, 1998. "Does Economic Analysis Improve the Quality of Foreign Assistance?," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 12(3), pages 385-418, September.
    28. Kilby, Christopher, 2009. "The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank loan disbursements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 51-61, May.
    29. Bulman,David Janoff & Kolkma,Walter & Kraay,Aart C., 2015. "Good Countries or Good Projects ? Comparing Macro and Micro Correlates of World Bank and Asian Development Bank Project Performance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7245, The World Bank.
    30. Ashwin Kaja & Eric Werker, 2010. "Corporate Governance at the World Bank and the Dilemma of Global Governance," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 24(2), pages 171-198, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Eilers, Yota & Kluve, Jochen & Langbein, Jörg & Reiners, Lennart, 2023. "Volume, Risk, Complexity: What Makes Development Finance Projects Succeed or Fail?," IZA Discussion Papers 16691, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Erasmus Kersting & Christopher Kilby, 2019. "The rise of supplemental lending at the World Bank," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 52(4), pages 1655-1698, November.
    3. Erasmus Kersting & Christopher Kilby, 2021. "Do domestic politics shape U.S. influence in the World Bank?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 29-58, January.
    4. Mirko Heinzel, 2023. "Vytautas Jankauskas and Steffen Eckhard. 2023. The Politics of Evaluation in International Organizations (Oxford: Oxford University Press)," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 777-781, October.
    5. Ryan C. Briggs, 2020. "Results from single-donor analyses of project aid success seem to generalize pretty well across donors," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 947-963, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kilby, Christopher, 2015. "Assessing the impact of World Bank preparation on project outcomes," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 111-123.
    2. Christopher Kilby, 2012. "Assessing the contribution of donor agencies to aid effectiveness: The impact of World Bank preparation on project outcomes," Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series 20, Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics.
    3. Presbitero, Andrea F., 2016. "Too much and too fast? Public investment scaling-up and absorptive capacity," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 17-31.
    4. Kilby, Christopher, 2013. "The political economy of project preparation: An empirical analysis of World Bank projects," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 211-225.
    5. Hauke Feil, 2021. "The cancer of corruption and World Bank project performance: Is there a connection?," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 39(3), pages 381-397, May.
    6. Axel Dreher & Stephan Klasen & James Raymond Vreeland & Eric Werker, 2013. "The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically Driven Aid Less Effective?," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(1), pages 157-191.
    7. David Bulman & Walter Kolkma & Aart Kraay, 2017. "Good countries or good projects? Comparing macro and micro correlates of World Bank and Asian Development Bank project performance," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 335-363, September.
    8. Denizer, Cevdet & Kaufmann, Daniel & Kraay, Aart, 2013. "Good countries or good projects? Macro and micro correlates of World Bank project performance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 288-302.
    9. Silvia Marchesi & Tania Masi, 2021. "Delegation of implementation in project aid," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 655-687, July.
    10. Axel Dreher & Katharina Michaelowa, 2008. "The political economy of international organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 331-334, December.
    11. Kersting, Erasmus K. & Kilby, Christopher, 2016. "With a little help from my friends: Global electioneering and World Bank lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 153-165.
    12. Limodio, Nicola, 2011. "The success of infrastructure projects in low-income countries and the role of selectivity," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5694, The World Bank.
    13. Mitchell Watkins, 2022. "Undermining conditionality? The effect of Chinese development assistance on compliance with World Bank project agreements," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 667-690, October.
    14. Silvia Marchesi & Tania Masi, 2019. "Allocation of Implementing Power: Evidence from World Bank Projects," Development Working Papers 447, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.
    15. Mirko Heinzel & Andrea Liese, 2021. "Managing performance and winning trust: how World Bank staff shape recipient performance," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 625-653, July.
    16. Erasmus Kersting & Christopher Kilby, 2019. "The rise of supplemental lending at the World Bank," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 52(4), pages 1655-1698, November.
    17. Axel Dreher & Vera Eichenauer & Kai Gehring & Vera Z. Eichenauer, 2013. "Geopolitics, Aid and Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series 4299, CESifo.
    18. Silvia Marchesi & Tania Masi & Saumik Paul, 2021. "Project Aid and Firm Performance," Working Papers 479, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2021.
    19. Bulman,David Janoff & Kolkma,Walter & Kraay,Aart C., 2015. "Good Countries or Good Projects ? Comparing Macro and Micro Correlates of World Bank and Asian Development Bank Project Performance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7245, The World Bank.
    20. Fuchs, Andreas & Dreher, Axel & Hodler, Roland & Parks, Bradley C. & Raschky, Paul, 2015. "Aid on Demand: African Leaders and the Geography of China s Foreign Assistance," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112838, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • H43 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
    • O22 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Project Analysis

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-22121-8_6. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.