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Delegation of implementation in project aid

Author

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  • Silvia Marchesi

    (University of Milano Bicocca
    Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano)

  • Tania Masi

    (University of Milano Bicocca)

Abstract

In this paper we explore the factors that determine delegation of implementation in project aid. In particular, focusing on the importance of informational asymmetry between levels of government, we empirically assess whether this choice is influenced by the relative importance of the local information at the recipient country level. Moreover, we test whether this choice can in turn influence project performance. Using information on more than 5800 World Bank projects for the period 1995-2014, and controlling for characteristics at both country and project level, we find that transparency does influence the probability that a project is implemented locally rather than nationally. More specifically, a one standard deviation decline in transparency increases the probability of a locally implemented project by three percentage points. We also find that a local implementing agency may increase the probability of a successful project only up to a certain level of a country’s transparency.

Suggested Citation

  • Silvia Marchesi & Tania Masi, 2021. "Delegation of implementation in project aid," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 655-687, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:16:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s11558-020-09396-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-020-09396-9
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    Cited by:

    1. Eilers, Yota & Kluve, Jochen & Langbein, Jörg & Reiners, Lennart, 2023. "Volume, Risk, Complexity: What Makes Development Finance Projects Succeed or Fail?," IZA Discussion Papers 16691, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Bommer, Christian & Dreher, Axel & Perez-Alvarez, Marcello, 2022. "Home bias in humanitarian aid: The role of regional favoritism in the allocation of international disaster relief," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    3. Marchesi, Silvia & Masi, Tania & Paul, Saumik, 2021. "Project Aid and Firm Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 14705, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Philip Keefer & Christopher Kilby, 2021. "Introduction to the special issue: In memoriam Stephen Knack," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 473-493, July.
    5. Steffen Eckhard & Vytautas Jankauskas & Elena Leuschner & Ian Burton & Tilman Kerl & Rita Sevastjanova, 2023. "The performance of international organizations: a new measure and dataset based on computational text analysis of evaluation reports," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 753-776, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Foreign aid; World Bank projects; Delegation; Transparency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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