Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients
AbstractThis paper analyzes the impact of donor fragmentation on the quality of government bureaucracy in aid-recipient nations. A formal model of a donor's decision to hire government administrators to manage donor-funded projects predicts that the number of administrators hired declines as the donor's share of other projects in the country increases, and as the donor's"altruism"(concern for the success of other donors'projects) increases. These hypotheses are supported by cross-country empirical tests using an index of bureaucratic quality available for aid-recipient nations over the 1982-2001 period. Declines in bureaucratic quality are associated with higher donor fragmentation (reflecting the presence of many donors, each with a small share of aid), and with smaller shares of aid coming from multilateral agencies, a proxy for donor"altruism."
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3186.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2004
Date of revision:
Economic Adjustment and Lending; Decentralization; Health Economics&Finance; Development Economics&Aid Effectiveness; Public Health Promotion; Development Economics&Aid Effectiveness; Economic Adjustment and Lending; Health Economics&Finance; ICT Policy and Strategies; Health Monitoring&Evaluation;
Other versions of this item:
- Knack, Stephen & Rahman, Aminur, 2007. "Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 176-197, May.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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