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Governance and growth: measurement and evidence

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  • Knack, Stephen

Abstract

This paper describes the gradual accumulation of indicators and evidence of the links between governance and growth, focusing on broad cross-country analyses. While each governance indicator developed thus far is in some way imperfect, the faults of some measures are entirely independent from those of others. Therefore, in aggregate, the totality of indicators point in the same direction: good governance is crucial for growth. Unfortunately, while current indicators are getting better at determining the quality of governance, they still are unable to implicate particular institutional arrangements that donors should devote their attention and resources towards. Moreover, the subjectivity of some indicators invites suspicion from local governments and makes reform difficult.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28050/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 28050.

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Date of creation: Feb 2002
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:28050

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Keywords: governance; growth; institutional development;

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References

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  1. Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2002. "The Political Economy Of Government Responsiveness: Theory And Evidence From India," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1415-1451, November.
  2. O'Connell, Stephen A. & Soludo, Charles C., 2001. "Aid Intensity in Africa," World Development, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(9), pages 1527-1552, September.
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  7. La Porta, Rafael, et al, 1997. "Trust in Large Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 333-38, May.
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  9. Alberto Alesina & Sule Ozler & Nouriel Roubini & Phillip Swagel, 1992. "Political Instability and Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 4173, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Stephen Knack, 2001. "Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross-Country Empirical Tests," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 310-329, October.
  11. Knack, Stephen & Rahman, Aminur, 2004. "Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3186, The World Bank.
  12. Zak, Paul J & Knack, Stephen, 2001. "Trust and Growth," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(470), pages 295-321, April.
  13. Barro, Robert J, 1996. " Democracy and Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-27, March.
  14. Keefer, Philip & Knack, Stephen, 2000. "Polarization, politics, and property rights : links between inequality and growth," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2418, The World Bank.
  15. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1995. "Institutions And Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 207-227, November.
  16. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
  17. Dollar, David & Kraay, Aart, 2002. " Growth Is Good for the Poor," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 195-225, September.
  18. Alesina, Alberto & Baqir, Reza & Easterly, William, 1999. "Public goods and ethnic divisions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2108, The World Bank.
  19. La Ferrara, Eliana & Alesina, Alberto, 2000. "Participation in Heterogeneous Communities," Scholarly Articles 4551796, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  20. Knack, Stephen & Keefer, Philip, 1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1251-88, November.
  21. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1998. "The Quality of Goverment," NBER Working Papers 6727, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Alberto Alesina & Edward Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, 2001. "Why Doesn't The US Have a European-Style Welfare State?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research 1933, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  23. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker Than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116, February.
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  25. A. Chong & C. Calderón, 2000. "Causality and Feedback Between Institutional Measures and Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 69-81, 03.
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  28. Clague, Christopher & Gleason, Suzanne & Knack, Stephen, 2001. "Determinants of lasting democracy in poor countries," MPRA Paper 28048, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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Cited by:
  1. Susana Ferreira & Jeffrey Vincent, 2010. "Governance and Timber Harvests," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 47(2), pages 241-260, October.
  2. Loayza, Norman V. & Soto, Raimundo, 2004. "On the measurement of market-oriented reforms," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3371, The World Bank.

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