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Governance and growth: measurement and evidence

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  • Knack, Stephen

Abstract

This paper describes the gradual accumulation of indicators and evidence of the links between governance and growth, focusing on broad cross-country analyses. While each governance indicator developed thus far is in some way imperfect, the faults of some measures are entirely independent from those of others. Therefore, in aggregate, the totality of indicators point in the same direction: good governance is crucial for growth. Unfortunately, while current indicators are getting better at determining the quality of governance, they still are unable to implicate particular institutional arrangements that donors should devote their attention and resources towards. Moreover, the subjectivity of some indicators invites suspicion from local governments and makes reform difficult.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28050/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 28050.

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Date of creation: Feb 2002
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:28050

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Keywords: governance; growth; institutional development;

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References

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  3. Barro, Robert J, 1996. " Democracy and Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-27, March.
  4. Keefer, Philip & Knack, Stephen, 2002. " Polarization, Politics and Property Rights: Links between Inequality and Growth," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 111(1-2), pages 127-54, March.
  5. Alberto Alesina & Edward Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, 2001. "Why Doesn't The US Have a European-Style Welfare State?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1933, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  6. Clague, Christopher & Gleason, Suzanne & Knack, Stephen, 2001. "Determinants of lasting democracy in poor countries," MPRA Paper 28048, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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  9. Zak, Paul J & Knack, Stephen, 2001. "Trust and Growth," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(470), pages 295-321, April.
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  12. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2000. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 7771, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2000. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers 28, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  14. Roubini, Nouriel & Swagel, Phillip & Ozler, Sule & Alesina, Alberto, 1996. "Political Instability and Economic Growth," Scholarly Articles 4553024, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  15. La Porta, Rafael, et al, 1997. "Trust in Large Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 333-38, May.
  16. Stephen Knack, 2001. "Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross-Country Empirical Tests," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 310-329, October.
  17. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "The Quality of Government," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1847, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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  20. O'Connell, Stephen A. & Soludo, Charles C., 2001. "Aid Intensity in Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(9), pages 1527-1552, September.
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  23. Knack, Stephen & Keefer, Philip, 1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1251-88, November.
  24. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1995. "Institutions And Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 207-227, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Susana Ferreira & Jeffrey Vincent, 2010. "Governance and Timber Harvests," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 47(2), pages 241-260, October.
  2. Loayza, Norman V. & Soto, Raimundo, 2004. "On the measurement of market-oriented reforms," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3371, The World Bank.

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