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Strengthening the Foundations? Alternative Institutions for Finance and Development

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  • William N. Kring
  • Kevin P. Gallagher

Abstract

The 21st century has ushered in the emergence of alternative institutions for liquidity provision and development finance, many of which are Southern‐led. The special issue that follows this Introduction assesses the extent to which existing theoretical perspectives and tools are sufficient for evaluating the implications of these alternatives for the global financial architecture. Our analysis finds that while an increasingly varied landscape of diverse institutions designed to foster financial stability and development comes with inherent risks, these new forms of finance bring real benefits to an architecture that has long been deemed insufficient. Larger and more capable Southern‐led institutions not only mean additional sources of financing for emerging market and developing countries, but also could increase their voice in an international financial architecture long dominated by the most advanced economies. That said, the variation in the landscape could create inequities and fault lines between new and existing institutions, which will be difficult to overcome through the coordination of a fragmented and diverse system. Finally, despite the increases in capital for liquidity provision and development made available by these new institutions, significantly more financing and coordination will be needed to achieve financial stability and economic development on a global scale.

Suggested Citation

  • William N. Kring & Kevin P. Gallagher, 2019. "Strengthening the Foundations? Alternative Institutions for Finance and Development," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 50(1), pages 3-23, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:devchg:v:50:y:2019:i:1:p:3-23
    DOI: 10.1111/dech.12464
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    2. Evgeny Vinokurov, 2021. "Interaction of Eurasian and international financial institutions," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(2-3), pages 265-282, April.
    3. Gomes, Matheus da Costa & Valle, Mauricio Ribeiro do, 2023. "Do companies that benefit from development banks' funding invest more? New evidence from Brazil," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    4. Stubbs, Thomas & Kring, William & Laskaridis, Christina & Kentikelenis, Alexander & Gallagher, Kevin, 2021. "Whatever it takes? The global financial safety net, Covid-19, and developing countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    5. Cipoletta Tomassian, Georgina & Abdo, Tarek, 2022. "Development bank financing in the context of the COVID-19 crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean," Financiamiento para el Desarrollo 47882, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    6. Evgeny Vinokurov & Artem Levenkov, 2021. "The Enlarged Global Financial Safety Net," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 12(1), pages 15-23, February.
    7. Kevin P. Gallagher & Haihong Gao & William N. Kring & José A. Ocampo & Ulrich Volz, 2021. "Safety First: Expanding the Global Financial Safety Net in Response to COVID‐19," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 12(1), pages 140-148, February.
    8. Susanne Lütz, 2021. "Global–Regional Realignments in Trade, Finance and Development: Introduction to the Special Issue," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 12(S4), pages 5-13, May.

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