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International institutions and credible commitment of non-democracies

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  • Songying Fang

    ()

  • Erica Owen

    ()

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11558-011-9102-0
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal The Review of International Organizations.

    Volume (Year): 6 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 2 (July)
    Pages: 141-162

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:6:y:2011:i:2:p:141-162

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    Web page: http://www.springer.com/business/sociology/journal/11558

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    Related research

    Keywords: Non-democracies; Credible commitment; Economic reforms; The IMF; F53; O57; P33;

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    References

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    1. Martin S. Edwards, 2005. "Investor Responses to IMF Program Suspensions: Is Noncompliance Costly?," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 86(4), pages 857-873.
    2. Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 190-214, March.
    3. Uma Ramakrishnan & Alun H. Thomas, 2006. "The Incidence and Effectiveness of Prior Actions in IMF-Supported Programs," IMF Working Papers 06/213, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Mansfield, Edward D. & Pevehouse, Jon C., 2006. "Democratization and International Organizations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(01), pages 137-167, January.
    5. Li, Quan & Resnick, Adam, 2003. "Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(01), pages 175-211, December.
    6. Weeks, Jessica L., 2008. "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(01), pages 35-64, January.
    7. Martin Gassebner & Noel Gaston & Michael Lamla, 2007. "The Inverse Domino Effect: Are Economic Reforms Contagious?," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series 31-07, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    8. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521816755 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
    10. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(04), pages 803-832, December.
    11. Bird, Graham, 2002. "The credibility and signalling effect of IMF programmes," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 24(9), pages 799-811, December.
    12. Mansfield, Edward D. & Milner, Helen V. & Rosendorff, B. Peter, 2002. "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(03), pages 477-513, June.
    13. Ai, Chunrong & Norton, Edward C., 2003. "Interaction terms in logit and probit models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 123-129, July.
    14. Graham Bird & Dane Rowlands, 2005. "The IMF and the Mobilization of Foreign Aid," School of Economics Discussion Papers 1105, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    15. Gould, Erica R., 2003. "Money Talks: Supplementary Financiers and International Monetary Fund Conditionality," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(03), pages 551-586, June.
    16. Vreeland, James Raymond, 2008. "Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(01), pages 65-101, January.
    17. Simmons, Beth A. & Danner, Allison, 2010. "Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(02), pages 225-256, April.
    18. Martin Steinwand & Randall Stone, 2008. "The International Monetary Fund: A review of the recent evidence," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 123-149, June.
    19. Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Understanding Economic Policy Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 9-41, March.
    20. Ashoka Mody & Diego Saravia, 2005. "Catalyzing Private Capital Flows: Do IMF Programs Work as Commitment Devices?," Documentos de Trabajo 280, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    21. Glen Biglaiser & Karl DeRouen, 2010. "The effects of IMF programs on U.S. foreign direct investment in the developing world," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 73-95, March.
    22. Dai, Xinyuan, 2005. "Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(02), pages 363-398, April.
    23. Fang, Songying, 2010. "The Strategic Use of International Institutions in Dispute Settlement," International Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 5(2), pages 107-131, August.
    24. Pevehouse, Jon C., 2002. "Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(03), pages 515-549, June.
    25. Christian Bjørnskov & Niklas Potrafke, 2011. "Politics and privatization in Central and Eastern Europe," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 19(2), pages 201-230, 04.
    26. Dreher, Axel & Jensen, Nathan M, 2007. "Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of U.S. Interests on International Monetary Fund Conditions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(1), pages 105-24, February.
    27. Stone, Randall W., 2008. "The Scope of IMF Conditionality," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(04), pages 589-620, October.
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    Cited by:
    1. Molly Bauer & Cesi Cruz & Benjamin Graham, 2012. "Democracies only: When do IMF agreements serve as a seal of approval?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 33-58, March.

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