Every year thousands of firms are engaged in research joint ventures (RJV), where all knowledge gained through R&D is shared among members. Most of the empirical literature assumes members are non-cooperative in the product market. But many RJV members are rivals leaving open the possibility that firms may form RJVs to facilitate collusion. We exploit variation in RJV formation generated by a policy change that affects the collusive benefits but not the research synergies associated with an RJV. We estimate an RJV participation equation and find the decision to join is impacted by the policy change. Our results are consistent with research joint ventures serving a collusive function.
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Paper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW in its series IEW - Working Papers with number
iewwp448.
Find related papers by JEL classification: L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
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