The evolution of cheating in asymmetric contests
AbstractConsider a society where all agents initially play "fair" and one agent invents a "cheating" strategy such as doping in sports. Which factors determine the success of the new cheating strategy? In order to study this question we consider an evolutionary game with local information. Three factors determine the imitation dynamics of the model: the location and the type of the innovator, the distribution of types, and the information available to the agents. In particular we find that the economy is more likely to end up in a state where all agents cheat if the innovator is of low type or when the agents are maximally segregated.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich in its series IEW - Working Papers with number 314.
Date of creation: Feb 2007
Date of revision:
Evolutionary game theory; imitation dynamics; heterogeneity; local information; global interaction;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-02-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2008-02-09 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-02-09 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SPO-2008-02-09 (Sports & Economics)
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