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The evolution of cheating in asymmetric contests

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Author Info
Aleksander Berentsen
Esther Bruegger
Simon Loertscher

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Abstract

Consider a society where all agents initially play "fair" and one agent invents a "cheating" strategy such as doping in sports. Which factors determine the success of the new cheating strategy? In order to study this question we consider an evolutionary game with local information. Three factors determine the imitation dynamics of the model: the location and the type of the innovator, the distribution of types, and the information available to the agents. In particular we find that the economy is more likely to end up in a state where all agents cheat if the innovator is of low type or when the agents are maximally segregated.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW in its series IEW - Working Papers with number iewwp314.

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Date of creation: Feb 2007
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Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:314

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Related research
Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; imitation dynamics; heterogeneity; local information; global interaction;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

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  1. Matthias Kräkel, 2005. "Doping in Contest-Like Situations," Discussion Papers 46, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Matthias Kräkel, 2006. "Doping and Cheating in Contest-Like Situations," IZA Discussion Papers 2059, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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