Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values
AbstractThe Shapley value certainly is the most eminent single-point solution concept for TU-games. In its standard characterization, the null player property indicates the absence of solidarity among the players. First, we replace the null player property by a new axiom that guarantees null players non-negative payoffs whenever the grand coalition's worth is non-negative. Second, the equal treatment property is strengthened into desirability. This way, we obtain a new characterization of the class of egalitarian Shapley values, i.e., of convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal division solution. We complement this result by characterizations of the class of generalized consensus values, i.e., of convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal surplus division solution. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Leipzig, Faculty of Economics and Management Science in its series Working Papers with number 113.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Solidarity; egalitarian Shapley value; equal division value; desirability; generalized consensus value;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
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