Endogenous Enforcement of Intellectual Property, North-South Trade, and Growth
AbstractWhile most countries have harmonized intellectual property rights (IPR) legislation, the dispute about the optimal level of IPR-enforcement remains. This paper develops an endogenous growth framework with two open economies satisfying the classical North-South assumptions to study (a) IPR-enforcement in a decentralized game and (b) the desired globally-harmonized IPR-enforcement of the two regions. The results are compared to the constrained-efficient enforcement level. Our main insights are: The regions’ desired harmonized enforcement levels are higher than their equilibrium choices, however, the gap between the two shrinks with relative market size. While growth rates substiantially increase when IPR-enforcement is harmonized at the North’s desired level, our numerical simulation suggests that the South may also benefit in terms of long-run welfare.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich in its series CER-ETH Economics working paper series with number 11/150.
Length: 52 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2011
Date of revision:
Endogenous Growth; Intellectual Property Rights; Trade; Dynamic Game;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- O30 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-08-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-FDG-2011-08-15 (Financial Development & Growth)
- NEP-INO-2011-08-15 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2011-08-15 (Intellectual Property Rights)
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