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Corruption in Tax and Taxing the Corruption

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  • Pazhanisamy, R.

Abstract

Most of the countries in the world face corruption and struggling against to it in many aspects. Due to various loopholes and institutional inefficiencies it continues to be pressing issues which affects public in various dimensions. The long existence of corruption around the world made an illusion to the policy makers and public as it is unavoidable and adjustable. This creates an intuition to esquire into what makes the corruption market successful all over the world for many centuries and what Economic theory is operate behind it. In this paper an inquiry is made into how the corruption market works effectively without any intervention. It also explore the possibility of the Ronald Coase theory’s to control the corruption and justifies what intervention is needed to achieve optimal amount of corruption. It concludes that to achieve the optimal amount of corruption in the society all farms of corruptions has to be internalized by introducing a permit and tax for corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Pazhanisamy, R., 2019. "Corruption in Tax and Taxing the Corruption," EconStor Preprints 193967, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:esprep:193967
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/193967/3/Corruption-in-Tax-and-Taxing-the-Corruption.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption in Tax; taxing the Corruption; Coase theorem and tax; tax evasion; breaking the tax evasion using Coase theorem; internalizing the externalize of corruption;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • G02 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Behavioral Finance: Underlying Principles
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

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