One-stop shopping behavior, buyer power, and upstream merger incentives
AbstractWe analyze how consumer preferences for one-stop shopping affect the bargaining relationship between a retailer and its suppliers. One-stop shopping preferences create demand complementarities among otherwise independent products which lead to two opposing effects on upstream merger incentives: first a standard double mark-up problem and second a bargaining effect. The former creates merger incentives while the later induce suppliers to bargain separately. When buyer power becomes large enough, then suppliers stay separated which raises final good prices. Such an outcome is more likely when one-stop shopping is pronounced. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) in its series DICE Discussion Papers with number 27.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
One-stop shopping; buyer power; supplier merger;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
- Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-08-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-08-02 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2011-08-02 (Industrial Competition)
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