I assess rigorously the countervailing-power hypothesis using a model that captures the main ingredients of Galbraith's (1952) arguments as well as some of the important features of the retail industry. I demonstrate that an increase in the amount of countervailing power possessed by a dominant retailer can indeed lead to a fall in retail prices for consumers. However, total surplus does not always increase with the rise of countervailing power because of the possible efficiency loss in retailing. Furthermore, the presence of fringe competition is crucial for countervailing power to benefit consumers. Copyright 2003 by the RAND Corporation.
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Volume (Year): 34 (2003) Issue (Month): 4 (Winter) Pages: 612-25 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Pierpaolo Battigalli & Chiara Fumagalli & Michele Polo, 2006.
"Buyer Power and Quality Improvement,"
Working Papers
310, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
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Suchan Chae & Paul Heidhues, 2003.
"Buyers’ Alliances for Bargaining Power,"
CIG Working Papers
SP II 2003-24, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
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