Kaupendamáttur á sementsmarkaði
[Buyer power in the cement industry]
AbstractThe Icelandic Competition Council recently ruled that a cement supplier with 75% market share is not dominant. The ruling was based on countervailing power of local concrete producers. To test the economic arguments for the ruling, we present a simplified bilateral oligopoly model of the in¬dustry where a new supplier enters a market competing with an incumbent. We show that it may be rational for buyers, given that some buying firms have switched to an entrant, to stay with a less efficient incumbent. Contracts negotiated with the incumbent are not as advantageous as those the entrant offers, but better than those that would prevail in monopoly of the entrant. This supports the aforementioned ruling.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 14742.
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Bilateral Oligopoly; Countervailing Power; Cement Industry;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
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