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Exclusive Dealing and Common Agency in International Markets

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Author Info
Raff, Horst
Schmitt, Nicolas

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Abstract

This paper investigates the contractual choice between exclusive dealing and common agency in a simple international oligopoly model where products are sold through intermediaries. We find that when trade barriers are high domestic firms tend to adopt exclusive dealing contracts, whereas trade liberalization may lead firms to choose common agency. Social welfare can be raised by prohibiting exclusive dealing (common agency) when trade barriers are high (low) and products are close substitutes.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21985
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics in its series Economics Working Papers with number 2004,09.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:cauewp:2440

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Web page: http://www.wiso.uni-kiel.de/econ/

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Related research
Keywords: exclusive dealing; common agency; international trade; competition policy;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. David Besanko & Martin K. Perry, 1993. "Equilibrium Incentives for Exclusive Dealing in a Differentiated Products Oligopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(4), pages 646-668, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Martin Richardson, . "Trade Policy and Access to Retail Distribution," EPRU Working Paper Series 97-23, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  3. Fargeix, Andre & Perloff, Jeffrey M., 1989. "The effect of tariffs in markets with vertical restraints," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1-2), pages 99-117, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Esther Gal-Or, 1991. "A Common Agency with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 274-286, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1998. "Exclusive Dealing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 64-103, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Raff, Horst & Schmitt, Nicolas, 2005. "Endogenous vertical restraints in international trade," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1877-1889, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2002. "Integration Versus Outsourcing In Industry Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(1), pages 85-120, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Barbara J. Spencer & Larry D. Qiu, 2000. "Keiretsu and Relationship-Specific Investment: A Barrier to Trade?," NBER Working Papers 7572, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Comanor, William S & Frech, H E, III, 1985. "The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 539-46, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Mathewson, G Frank & Winter, Ralph A, 1987. "The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 1057-62, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Horst Raff & Nicolas Schmitt, 2009. "Buyer Power in International Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Ganslandt, Mattias & Maskus, Keith E., 2005. "Vertical Distribution, Parallel Trade, and Price Divergence in Integrated Markets," Working Paper Series 639, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Carsten Eckel, 2009. "International Trade and Retailing," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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