Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Exclusive Dealing and Common Agency in International Markets

Contents:

Author Info

  • Raff, Horst
  • Schmitt, Nicolas

Abstract

This paper investigates the contractual choice between exclusive dealing and common agency in a simple international oligopoly model where products are sold through intermediaries. We find that when trade barriers are high domestic firms tend to adopt exclusive dealing contracts, whereas trade liberalization may lead firms to choose common agency. Social welfare can be raised by prohibiting exclusive dealing (common agency) when trade barriers are high (low) and products are close substitutes. --

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/21985/1/EWP-2004-09.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics in its series Economics Working Papers with number 2004,09.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zbw:cauewp:2440

Contact details of provider:
Postal: D-24098 Kiel,Wilhelm-Seelig-Platz 1
Phone: 0431-880 3282
Fax: 0431-880 3150
Web page: http://www.wiso.uni-kiel.de/econ/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: exclusive dealing; common agency; international trade; competition policy;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Horst Raff & Nicolas Schmitt, 2000. "Endogenous Vertical Restraints in International Trade," Discussion Papers dp00-04, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, revised Feb 2000.
  2. Horst Raff & Nicolas Schmitt, 2004. "Exclusive Dealing and Common Agency in International Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 1168, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919, November.
  4. Martin Richardson, . "Trade Policy and Access to Retail Distribution," EPRU Working Paper Series 97-23, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  5. Fargeix, Andre & Perloff, Jeffrey M, 1987. "The effect of tariffs in markets with vertical restraints," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt49v754qw, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
  6. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2002. "Integration Versus Outsourcing In Industry Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(1), pages 85-120, February.
  7. Bernheim, B.D., 1992. "Exclusive Dealing," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1622, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  8. Sadao Nagaoka & Akira Goto, 1997. "Vertical Restraints and Market Access," Empirica, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 21-36, January.
  9. Spencer, Barbara J & Qiu, Larry D, 2001. "Keiretsu and Relationship-Specific Investment: A Barrier to Trade?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(4), pages 871-901, November.
  10. Martimort, David, 1994. "Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory," IDEI Working Papers 43, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 1996.
  11. Comanor, William S & Frech, H E, III, 1985. "The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 539-46, June.
  12. Marvel, Howard P, 1982. "Exclusive Dealing," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 1-25, April.
  13. Mathewson, G Frank & Winter, Ralph A, 1987. "The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 1057-62, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Raff, Horst & Schmitt, Nicolas, 2009. "Buyer power in international markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 222-229, November.
  2. Horst Raff & Nicolas Schmitt, 2011. "Manufacturers and Retailers in the Global Economy," Kiel Working Papers 1711, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  3. Ganslandt, Mattias & Maskus, Keith E., 2005. "Vertical Distribution, Parallel Trade, and Price Divergence in Integrated Markets," Working Paper Series 639, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  4. Carsten Eckel, 2009. "International Trade and Retailing," CESifo Working Paper Series 2597, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Raff, Horst & Schmitt, Nicolas, 2006. "Exclusive dealing and common agency in international markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 485-503, March.
  6. Felbermayr, Gabriel J. & Jung, Benjamin, 2008. "Trade intermediaries, incomplete contracts, and the choice of export modes," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 317, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:cauewp:2440. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.