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Endogenous Vertical Restraints in International Trade

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Author Info
Raff, Horst
Schmitt, Nicolas

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Abstract

This paper examines interbrand competition between a domestic and a foreign manufacturer who market their products through intermediaries. The contracts manufacturers offer these intermediaries are endogenous. In equilibrium contracts may specify exclusive territories (ET), depending on the degree of substitutability between products and the level and degree of transparency of trade barriers. Trade liberalization, through lower or more transparent barriers, may lead manufacturers to use ET, thereby substituting private anti-competitive arrangements for government-imposed barriers. This substitution may decrease competition and welfare, and thus create a role for competition policy in a freer trade environment.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 284.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_284

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. repec:fth:michin:337 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Levinsohn, J., 1994. "Competition Policy and International Trade," Working Papers 362, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
    Other versions:
  3. Rauch, James E., 1999. "Networks versus markets in international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 7-35, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Martin Richardson, . "Trade Policy and Access to Retail Distribution," EPRU Working Paper Series 97-23, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  5. Fargeix, Andre & Perloff, Jeffrey M., 1989. "The effect of tariffs in markets with vertical restraints," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1-2), pages 99-117, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Massimo Motta & Fabrizio Onida, 1997. "Trade Policy and Competition Policy," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 56(1-2), pages 67-97, June.
  7. Richardson, Martin, 1999. "Trade and Competition Policies: Concordia Discors?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(4), pages 649-64, October.
  8. Gallini, Nancy T. & Hollis, Aidan, 1999. "A contractual approach to the gray market," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 1-21, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-48, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Saxonhouse, Gary R, 1993. "What Does Japanese Trade Structure Tell Us about Japanese Trade Policy?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 21-43, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Henrik Horn & James Levinsohn, 1997. "Merger Policies and Trade Liberalization," NBER Working Papers 6077, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Joseph F. Francois & Henrik Horn, 1998. "Competition Policy in an Open Economy," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 98-092/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  13. Saxonhouse, G.R., 1993. "What Does Japanese Trade Structure Tell Us about Japanese Trade Policy?," Working Papers 337, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
  14. Sadao Nagaoka, 1998. "International Trade Aspects of Competition Policy," NBER Working Papers 6720, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Keith Head & John Ries, 1997. "International Mergers and Welfare under Decentralized Competition Policy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 1104-23, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-819, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. repec:fth:michin:362 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Gal-Or, Esther, 1991. "Duopolistic vertical restraints," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1237-1253, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Horst Raff & Nicolas Schmitt, 2004. "Exclusive Dealing and Common Agency in International Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Horst Raff & Nicolas Schmitt, 2008. "Buyer Power in International Markets," Kiel Working Papers 1431, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Yongmin Chen & Jota Ishikawa & Zhihao Yu, 2002. "Trade Liberalization and Strategic Outsourcing," Carleton Economic Papers 02-12, Carleton University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Carsten Eckel, 2009. "International Trade and Retailing," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ganslandt, Mattias & Maskus, Keith E., 2007. "Wholesale Price Discrimination and Parallel Imports," Working Paper Series 702, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Ganslandt, Mattias & Maskus, Keith E., 2005. "Vertical Distribution, Parallel Trade, and Price Divergence in Integrated Markets," Working Paper Series 639, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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