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Assignment Games with Externalities And Matching-Based Cournot Competition

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  • Chen, Bo

Abstract

We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identity-dependent externalities. A concept of conjectural equilibrium is proposed, and the universal conjecture is shown to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the general existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept to a matching-based Cournot model in which the unit production cost of a firm depends on both the technology of the firm and the human capital of the manager hired, and show that if technology and human capital are complementary, the positive assortative matching (PAM) is a stable matching under rational expectations, or even if firm technology and human capital are substitutable yet the substitutive effect is dominated by the marginal effects of technology and human capital, the PAM is still a rational stable matching.However, if the substitutive effect on the unit production cost is sufficiently strong or the market demand is sufficiently high, the negative assortative matching is a rational stable matching.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Bo, 2013. "Assignment Games with Externalities And Matching-Based Cournot Competition," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 08/2013, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bonedp:082013
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Dutta, Bhaskar & Masso, Jordi, 1997. "Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have Preferences over Colleagues," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 464-475, August.
    4. Echenique, Federico & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2007. "A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 46-71, April.
    5. Gudmundsson, Jens & Habis, Helga, 2013. "Assignment Games with Externalities," Working Papers 2013:27, Lund University, Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pycia, Marek & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2019. "Matching with Externalities," CEPR Discussion Papers 13994, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Jens Gudmundsson & Helga Habis, 2017. "Assignment games with externalities revisited," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(2), pages 247-257, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative Games; Two-sided Matching; Assignment Games; Externalities; Transferable Utility; Cournot Competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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