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Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities

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Author Info

  • Mumcu, Ayse
  • Saglam, Ismail

Abstract

We consider one-to-one matching with externalities, where the individuals are allowed to be single. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of the stable set and the core.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V88-5033XPW-1/2/1cba8db21cfef04d83df250cbbf9ad95
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 60 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
Pages: 154-159

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:60:y:2010:i:2:p:154-159

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

Related research

Keywords: One-to-one matching Externalities Stability Core;

References

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  1. Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip & Nakamura, Toshifumi, 2007. "Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples," Research Memorandum 025, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  2. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
  3. John P. Conley & Hideo Konishi, 2000. "Migration-Proof Tiebout Equilibrium: Existence and Asymptotic Efficiency," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 452, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 01 Dec 2000.
  4. Federico Echenique & Mehmet B. Yenmez, 2005. "A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues," Working Papers 2005.120, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  5. Ayse Mumcu & Ismail Saglam, 2008. "Rationalizability of One-to-One Matchings with Externalities," Working Papers 0807, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
  6. Sasaki, Hiroo & Toda, Manabu, 1996. "Two-Sided Matching Problems with Externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 93-108, July.
  7. Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip, 2005. "Stable matchings and preferences of couples," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 75-106, March.
  8. Alcalde, Jose & Revilla, Pablo, 2004. "Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(8), pages 869-887, December.
  9. Dutta, Bhaskar & Masso, Jordi, 1997. "Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have Preferences over Colleagues," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 464-475, August.
  10. Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2004. "Marriage markets with externalities," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 04-11, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
  11. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2008:i:33:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2007:i:57:p:1-5 is not listed on IDEAS
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Bando, Keisuke, 2012. "Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 14-20.
  2. Ekrem Akkaya & Ayþe Mumcu, 2012. "Student Placement Problems: An Application to the ERASMUS Exchange Program," Bogazici Journal of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 26(2), pages 63-82.

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