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Many-to-One Matching when Colleagues Matter

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  • Pablo Revilla

    (Universidad Pablo de Olavide)

Abstract

This paper studies many-to-one matching market in which each agent’s preferences not only depend on the institution that hires her, but also on the group of her colleagues, which are matched to the same institution. With an unrestricted domain of preferences the non-emptiness of the core is not guaranteed. Under certain conditions on agents’ preferences, we show that two possible situations in which, at least, one stable allocation exists, emerge. The first condition, called Group Togetherness, reflects real-life situations in which agents are more concerned about an acceptable set of colleagues than about the firm hiring them. The second one, Common Best Colleague, refers to markets in which a workers’ ranking is accepted by workers and firms present in such markets.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2007.87.

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Date of creation: Sep 2007
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2007.87

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Keywords: Many-to-one matching; Hedonic; Coalitions; Stability; Colleagues;

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References

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  1. José Alcalde & Pablo Revilla, 2003. "Researching with Whom? Stability and Manipulation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/35, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  2. Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi & Tayfun Sonmez, 1999. "Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game," Boston College Working Papers in Economics, Boston College Department of Economics 449, Boston College Department of Economics.
  3. Federico Echenique & Mehmet B. Yenmez, 2005. "A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2005.120, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  4. Dutta, B. & Masso, J., 1996. "Stability of Matchings when Individuals Have Preferences Over Colleagues," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 325.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  5. José Alcalde & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2006. "Coalition Formation and Stability," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 365-375, October.
  6. Dreze, J H & Greenberg, J, 1980. "Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 987-1003, May.
  7. Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip, 2005. "Stable matchings and preferences of couples," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 75-106, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Dimitrov, Dinko & Lazarova, Emiliya, 2011. "Two-sided coalitional matchings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 46-54, July.
  2. Emiliya Lazarova & Dinko Dimitrov, 2013. "Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 40(4), pages 1205-1229, April.
  3. Kominers, Scott Duke, 2010. "Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 773-780, March.
  4. Federico Echenique & Mehmet B. Yenmez, 2005. "A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2005.120, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  5. Dinko Dimitrov & Emiliya Lazarova, 2008. "Coalitional Matchings," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2008.45, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

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