Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Many-to-one Matching When Colleagues Matter

Contents:

Author Info

Abstract

This paper studies many-to-one matching markets in which each agent’s preferences not only depend on the institution that hires her, but also on the group of her colleagues, which are matched to the same institution. With an unrestricted domain of preferences the non-emptiness of the core is not guaranteed. We present some conditions on agents’ preferences which determine two possible situations. In both situations, at least one stable allocation exists. The first one reflects real-life situations in which the agents are more worried about an acceptable set of colleagues than the firm hiring them. The second one refers to markets in which a workers’ ranking is accepted by workers and firms in that market.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://public.centrodeestudiosandaluces.es/pdfs/E200485.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centro de Estudios Andaluces in its series Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces with number E2004/85.

as in new window
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cea:doctra:e2004_85

Contact details of provider:
Postal: c/ Bailén 50. 41001 Sevilla
Phone: (34) 955 055 210
Fax: (34) 955 055 211
Email:
Web page: http://www.centrodeestudiosandaluces.es
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: many-to-one matching; hedonic coalitions; stability.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2004. "Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples," Working Papers 117, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  2. José Alcalde & Antonio Romero Medina, 2005. "Coaliton Formation And Stability," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 2005-21, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  3. Federico Echenique & Mehmet B. Yenmez, 2005. "A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2005.120, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  4. Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi & Tayfun Sonmez, 1999. "Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game," Boston College Working Papers in Economics, Boston College Department of Economics 449, Boston College Department of Economics.
  5. Dutta, B. & Masso, J., 1996. "Stability of Matchings when Individuals Have Preferences Over Colleagues," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 325.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  6. José Alcalde & Pablo Revilla, 2003. "Researching with Whom? Stability and Manipulation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces, Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/35, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  7. Dreze, J H & Greenberg, J, 1980. "Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 987-1003, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Dinko Dimitrov & Emiliya Lazarova, 2008. "Coalitional Matchings," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2008.45, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  2. Echenique, Federico & Yenmez, Mehmet B., 2005. "A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1226, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  3. Kominers, Scott Duke, 2010. "Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 773-780, March.
  4. Emiliya Lazarova & Dinko Dimitrov, 2013. "Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 40(4), pages 1205-1229, April.
  5. Dimitrov, Dinko & Lazarova, Emiliya, 2011. "Two-sided coalitional matchings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 46-54, July.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cea:doctra:e2004_85. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Teresa Rodríguez).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.