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On Credible Coalitional Deviations by Prudent Players

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Abstract

In this paper we first explore the predictive power of the solution notion called conservative stable standard of behaviour (CSSB), introduced by Greenberg (1990) in environments with farsighted players (as modelled in Xue (1998)) as intuitively it is quite nice. Unfortunately, we find that CSSB has a number of undesirable properties. Therefore, we introduce a refinement of this which we call conservative stable weak predictor. We explore some existence properties of this new solution.

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  • A Bhattacharya & A Ziad, "undated". "On Credible Coalitional Deviations by Prudent Players," Discussion Papers 09/33, Department of Economics, University of York.
    • Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:09/33
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    1. Herings, P.J.J. & Mauleon, A. & Vannetelbosch, V., 2000. "Social rationalizability," Research Memorandum 017, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coalitions; stable behaviour; perfect foresight;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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